BearWorks
MSU Graduate Theses
Spring 2017

The Third Offset: The U.S. Strategy to Combat Future Threats
Brian Charles Kempf

As with any intellectual project, the content and views expressed in this thesis may be
considered objectionable by some readers. However, this student-scholar’s work has been
judged to have academic value by the student’s thesis committee members trained in the
discipline. The content and views expressed in this thesis are those of the student-scholar and
are not endorsed by Missouri State University, its Graduate College, or its employees.

Follow this and additional works at: https://bearworks.missouristate.edu/theses
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Kempf, Brian Charles, "The Third Offset: The U.S. Strategy to Combat Future Threats" (2017). MSU
Graduate Theses. 3147.
https://bearworks.missouristate.edu/theses/3147

This article or document was made available through BearWorks, the institutional repository of Missouri State
University. The work contained in it may be protected by copyright and require permission of the copyright holder
for reuse or redistribution.
For more information, please contact BearWorks@library.missouristate.edu.

THE THIRD OFFSET: THE U.S. STRATEGY TO COMBAT FUTURE
THREATS

A Masters Thesis
Presented to
The Graduate College of
Missouri State University

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science, Defense and Strategic Studies

By
Brian C. Kempf
May 2017

THE THIRD OFFSET: THE U.S. STRATEGY TO COMBAT FUTURE
THREATS
Defense and Strategic Studies
Missouri State University, May 2017
Master of Science
Brian Kempf

ABSTRACT
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and into the 21st Century, the United States (U.S.)
has continued to maintain global commitments and a global presence. In addition, the
U.S. has expanded its aspirations to address a more diverse range of global security
challenges than in previous periods; from conventional conflicts to climate change. In
order to meet the demands of a 21st century superpower, the U.S. Department of Defense
is expected to conduct a broad range of operations across a spectrum of threats. Indeed,
U.S. technological superiority is a hallmark of U.S. military prowess and has been
instrumental in supporting Department of Defense functions. While the U.S. is currently
considered to have the most technologically advanced military in the world, the U.S.
technological advantage is dwindling. In response to the unpredictable security
environment and the dwindling U.S. technological edge, the U.S. Department of Defense
is pursuing a new strategy to offset future threats and maintain U.S. technological
superiority known as the “third offset” strategy. The third offset strategy consists of three
major thrusts: to develop cutting-edge technologies, to explore new operational concepts
utilizing cutting-edge technologies, and to acquire and retain the best and brightest
workforce to achieve the other two goals. Although still in its inchoate stages, it is yet to
be seen if the strategy will come to fruition and achieve the intended results.
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INTRODUCTION

The current global security environment is often characterized as uncertain and
unpredictable. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. has expanded its role in
addressing a diverse range of global security challenges. The U.S. is determined to
combat traditional security issues such as, conventional armed conflicts, and confront
new challenges like, the effects of climate change and guaranteeing U.S. energy security.
In order to meet these demands, the U.S. Department of Defense continues to conduct a
broad range of operations, across a spectrum of threats. Not only has the U.S. increased
the scope of its security missions, U.S. global commitments and partnerships remain
numerous with approximately 450,000 personnel deployed overseas and on U.S. vessels,
around the globe.1
Indeed, successfully managing U.S. commitments, as well as, addressing global
security challenges, is a formidable task. Moreover, the U.S. role as a global security
provider cannot be assumed to continue in an unpredictable future. To date, U.S.
technological superiority has been instrumental in facilitating the U.S. to meet its
commitments and address the ever increasing security challenges. The U.S. military is
the most technologically savvy, efficient, and effective military in the world. However,
the U.S. technological advantage is dwindling, and the U.S. freedom to navigate the
globe and intervene is being threatened.2 Near peers, like Russia and China, are

1. “About the Department of Defense (DOD),” U.S. Department of Defense, January
27, 2017, https://www.defense.gov/About, paragraph 6.
2. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America
2015, 3, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_
Strategy.pdf.
1

countering and copying U.S. technologies like precision munitions, surveillance
platforms, and command and control networks, in an effort to close the technological
gap.3 Additionally, features of the future security environment such as demographic
shifts, the diffusion of technology through globalization, new centers of power, and
unique strategies to upset the traditional power structure, could undermine U.S. influence,
power projections, and commitments.4
Globalization has created an environment where technologies that were once
reserved for major powers, with defense infrastructures, have proliferated and have
become easier for state and non-state actors to access and develop.5 For example,
autonomous aircraft, like drones, were once an exclusive capability of major states.
Now, drones have become smaller, more versatile, inexpensive, and commonplace. This
reality is illustrated by a quick internet search; drones are available to private citizens and
enthusiasts through the internet and retail stores, some costing less than US$100.6
Recreational drones utilize similar technology to their military counterparts and could
easily be converted to suit a terrorist organization’s, a criminal network’s, or a state
actor’s needs without having to develop a robust manufacturing infrastructure. This
reality highlights the dual use nature of emerging technologies; many have military and
civilian uses and can easily be converted to suit any actor’s objective.

3. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 4, http://archive.
defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.
4. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy, 1.
5. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 7.
6. A Google.com search of “drone” resulted in information pertaining to the purchase
of recreational drones and a link to BestBuy.com, where one can find a drone for under
US$100.
2

This example not only highlights how ubiquitous the systems have become, but
also the pivotal role private industry is beginning to play in producing cutting-edge
technologies. Current technological advancements are occurring within the private sector
for commercial uses and are considered to be outpacing the technological development
occurring within the Federal government.7 This is in contrast to the historic flow of
technology which was restricted to major defense contractors and the government which
then spread to the private sector for commercial exploitation.8 Radar, global positioning
systems, and the Internet are examples of government initiated technologies that became
widespread for civilian consumption. The inverted nature of the current technology flow
means the government must seek outside technologies for its own use and applications.9
The military modernization efforts by U.S. adversaries, the diffusion of technology due to
globalization, and the inverted nature of technological development are viewed by U.S.
leaders as contributing to the dwindling U.S. technological advantage.
In response to the unpredictable security environment and the dwindling U.S.
technological edge, the Pentagon recently released plans for a new “offset” strategy;
commonly referred to as the “third offset”. The third offset strategy was introduced in
2014 as part of a larger U.S. Department of Defense initiative. Laid out in the keynote
address before the Reagan National Defense Forum, former Secretary of Defense Hagel
announced the Defense Innovation Initiative. The foremost goal of this initiative is to

7. National Science and Technology Council Committee on Homeland and National
Security, A 21st Century Science, Technology, and Innovation Strategy for America’s
National Security, (2016), 5, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/
microsites/ostp/NSTC/national_s ecurity_s_and_t_strategy.pdf.
8. Ibid., 5.
9. Ibid., 1.
3

terminate the loss of the U.S. technological advantage to ensure the U.S. maintains a
robust and effective conventional deterrence.10 This extensive initiative is aimed with:
1) Developing cutting-edge technologies by focusing on fields such as robotics,
autonomous systems, miniaturization, analyzing big data, and advanced
manufacturing, like 3-D printing.
2) Exploring new operational concepts and approaches to warfighting by
utilizing the cutting-edge technologies developed.
3) Acquiring and retaining the best and brightest minds to pursue the previous
objectives.11
In short, technical innovation, coupled with the development of operational concepts and
doctrine, will comprise the third offset strategy.
An offset strategy is not novel. In fact, the U.S. has pursued an offset strategy on
two previous occasions since the end of World War II and the advent of the nuclear age.
The Pentagon defines the first offset as President Eisenhower’s “New Look” strategy
which offset Soviet conventional strength by bolstering U.S. nuclear forces.12 The
ultimate objective of the New Look was to deter Soviet aggression and increase security
“on the cheap” by investing in unconventional forces, which were considered less
expensive to field than conventional forces.13
As defined by the Pentagon, the second offset strategy began in the 1970s when
Pentagon leaders established the Long Range Research and Development Planning
Program (LRRDPP) that “helped develop and field revolutionary new systems such as
extended-range precision-guided munitions, stealth aircraft, and new intelligence,

10. Chuck Hagel, “Reagan National Defense Forum Keynote Address”, United States
Department of Defense, November 15, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/
Speech-View/Article/606635.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Patrick Garrity, “A New Look at the New Look”, Claremont Institute, December
14, 2012, http://www.claremont.org/crb/basicpage/a-new-look-at-the-new-look/.
4

surveillance and reconnaissance platforms”.14 The second offset period continued
through the 1980s with the investment and fielding of those technologies. The Pentagon
definition of the second offset is vague. While these technologies are important in the
U.S. military enterprise today, this definition fails to include doctrinal transformations
and training reforms that occurred alongside the advent of new technologies.
The first two offsets will be explained in greater detail in the following sections.
Also, it is important to note that these are Department of Defense delineations of offset
periods and not the author’s. It is accepted that others may have differing opinions as to
what constitutes an “offset” period in U.S. strategy. However, to limit the scope of
research, the Department of Defense periods are utilized since this is the organization
pursuing an offset strategy for the third time. The author’s explanation of historical
events and influencing factors are meant to add context to the Pentagon definitions of the
offset periods. In addition, a thorough research of each offset is helpful as it provides
historical lessons and a lens through which to examine the third offset.
In addition, since the prime topic of this discussion pertains to offset strategies, it
is important to define an “offset strategy” for the purposes of this document.
Fundamentally, an offset strategy seeks to counterbalance an adversary’s strength with a
technology, weapon, platform, and/or policy that serve as force multipliers thus
undermining the adversary’s strengths while enhancing one’s ability to deter or fight a
numerically superior enemy. In short, it is a strategy of quality and effectiveness over
quantity of capabilities; the objective is to not field troop for troop or tank for tank. A
portion of this definition, namely in regards to a numerically superior enemy, may not

14. Hagel, “Keynote Address”.
5

seem as applicable today as it was during the Cold War. However, taking into account
the number of contingencies and operations the U.S. may become involved in, coupled
with the broad spectrum of threats, have produced, in sum, a multiplicity of adversaries
and challenges that can be considered numerically superior.
Another useful topic to discuss before moving forward is the descriptive words
that accompany the word technology throughout the document. Current generation
technology, current technology, or off-the-shelf technology are those technologies that
have been well developed for years, like computers. While advances are occurring in
computer science and technology, that are enhancing computers, the machine itself is a
current generation technology. Over the horizon or advanced technology are
technologies that will become mainstream in the short term, three to five years. These
types of technologies have not been developed to their full potential, are untried but have
been under development long enough that their incorporation does not entail a great deal
of risk.15 Leap-ahead technologies are technologies that skip a generation of over the
horizon technology. Leap-ahead technologies may take ten years to field but could offer
greater benefit in the 15-20 year range.16 Having delineated those terms, the discussion is
left with the term cutting-edge technology from the third offset objectives. This term is
equivocal. It seems that the term cutting-edge technology is used by the Pentagon to
signify, emerging technologies to leap-ahead technologies, or any technology for that
matter, that has the greatest potential for military utility.

15. Frederick Kagan, Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military
Policy (New York, NY: Encounter Books, 2006), 71.
16. Richard Kugler, Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs: New Methods for a
New Era (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2006), 307, https://www.
hsdl.org/?view&did=481962.
6

While the offset strategies share a common concept and name, they are indeed
different from one another. The first two offsets were formulated to confront a
contemporary enemy or threat; the Soviet Union. The third offset is targeted to confront
future challenges and guarantee U.S. technological and military superiority. In
explanation, this offset is intended to address state and non-state actors, as well as, ensure
the U.S. has the freedom to conduct any operation, across the spectrum of threats,
anywhere in the world. By pursuing an offset strategy at present, the U.S. expects to
maintain its technological advantage ahead of any potential adversarial gains.
One can already begin to see problems with such a lofty strategy. Moreover, the
obstacles to implementation are numerous. Obvious obstacles include funding, due to
sequestration, and leadership changes, highlighted by the election of a new administration
to the White House. Another obstacle includes a defense enterprise that is resistant to
change. Even if the Department of Defense were to embrace change, the bureaucracy
tends to stymie innovation. The current bureaucracy precludes quick research,
development, testing, and fielding. A speedier process will be necessary for the future
due to the fast pace associated with technological development.
Regardless of one’s opinion concerning the necessity of the third offset, the
strategy encourages a higher level of discussion. That is, can the U.S. continue to rely on
technology to maintain its military superiority? Additionally, has the U.S. placed too
much importance on technology? Technology has been a major driver in U.S. security
since the beginning of the Cold War and a reversal would be a major change. Further,
there is much to debate as to whether the advent of new technologies are positive
developments. Also, if the diffusion of technology continues at the rate it is occurring

7

now, could the development of technologies, that will inevitably become widespread,
eventually bankrupt the state that develops technology? With that said, how long does
the U.S. expect this strategy to last? While the second offset granted the U.S. a
technological advantage for several decades, the U.S. advantage from the New Look was
brief.
The aforementioned issues raise a fundamental question; is this a judicious
strategy to pursue at this time? The strategy is intended to compete in a future security
environment that is admittedly unpredictable, and that, in it of itself, seems like a glaring
issue. Also, has the diffusion of technology and military modernization efforts by U.S.
adversaries created an environment where the U.S. technological superiority has
“dwindled”? In addition, one could argue that defense officials are hyping the future
threat to secure funding in austere times. With such a broad threat spectrum, can an
adequate strategy be developed? A valid view is that if the U.S. prepares for an unlimited
number of contingencies, it is not adequately preparing for any one contingency.
Additional considerations include: have the consequences on the future force been
adequately examined? How will units be structured? What will the future force look like
if it adopts the changes proposed in the third offset? The integration of more technology
into the military enterprise has serious ramifications. Not only are robots expected to
replace human jobs in the private sector, but one can almost guarantee this will occur in
the military as well. How will this situation impact individuals who pursue the military
as an option after high school or as a career? Will the U.S. military transform into an
elite cadre of tech soldiers that are removed from society? New technologies have
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ramifications for more than force structure. The rules and conduct of war may also
undergo changes as new technologies become commonplace.
Indeed, the third offset is still in its inchoate stages and numerous questions
abound concerning the strategy and its possible consequences. Military improvements
are not without their growing pains. Obstacles and possible consequences need to be
examined before the strategy is implemented to mitigate obstacles and address negative
consequences. Fortunately, the first two offsets provide some key lessons for the third
offset; some to be followed and some to be avoided. The third offset and its
ramifications should be scrutinized, not for damaging purposes, but for constructive
reasons, to benefit the U.S. defense enterprise.

9

THE FIRST OFFSET

Introduction to the New Look
The U.S. pursuit of an offset strategy is not novel. In fact, the U.S. has
implemented offset strategies twice since the 1950s. The first U.S. offset strategy
termed, the “New Look”, was introduced in the 1950s by the Eisenhower administration.
The New Look strategy strove to offset the Soviet Union’s conventional strength and
reduce the U.S. defense budget by relying on a solid U.S. nuclear arsenal to deter Soviet
aggression, and if needed, defeat Soviet aggression.17 In essence, the New Look sought
to transform the U.S. military into a nuclear fighting force with an emphasis on the
strategic deterrent deliverable by airpower.18
U.S. reliance on its nuclear arsenal to deter Soviet aggression lead to the
declaratory policy of Massive Retaliation; the overwhelming use of nuclear forces in the
event of Soviet aggression. It is important to note that this declaratory policy was not
solely intended for retaliation but was intended to deter Soviet aggression, in Europe,
where the U.S. and NATO forces were at a precarious conventional disadvantage.
Conventional parity with the Soviet Union would have been a monumental task.

17. Elliot Converse, History of Acquisition in the Department of Defense: Rearming
for the Cold War, 1945-1960 Vol. 1, (Washington, DC: Historical Office; Office of the
Secretary of Defense, 2012), 393, http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/
acquisition_pub/OSDHO-Acquisition-Series-Vol1.pdf?ver=2014-05-28-103257-540.
18. Richard Leighton, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: Strategy,
Money, and the New Look, 1953-1956 Vol. 3, ed. Alfred Goldberg, (Washington, DC:
Historical Office; Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2010), v, http://history.defense.gov/
Portals/70/Documents/secretaryofdefense/OSDSeries_Vol3.pdf.
10

Moreover, both the U.S. and NATO were unwilling to spend the resources needed to
create conventional parity.
The New Look was heavily influenced by historical events, as well as, the
personal beliefs of President Eisenhower and his administration. As with any grand
strategy, the implementation occurred and the consequences surfaced, over time. This
section will first explore those driving forces such as historical events, developing
technologies, and personal beliefs that influenced the administration to pursue sweeping
changes to the U.S. force. Secondly, this section will outline the execution, as well as,
detail the aftermath of the New Look on land, air, and sea assets of the services. Finally,
this section will discuss and examine key takeaways from the New Look that can be
applied when analyzing the third offset.

A Strong Economy, Armistice, and New Technology
While few individuals may be familiar with the New Look, many are aware of the
policy begotten from the New Look known as Massive Retaliation. Certainly,
Eisenhower’s declaratory policy of Massive Retaliation was a direct result of, and was
considered a viable course of action by the Eisenhower administration because of the
New Look. Surprisingly, the grand strategy and philosophy that produced Massive
Retaliation are often overlooked. However, the New Look was a practical and principled
strategy that was tailored to address threats within the limits of the Eisenhower
administration’s outlook. Interestingly, one of the greatest factors that influenced the
New Look was Eisenhower’s personal beliefs about defense spending and national
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power. Truly, these views steered the administration to develop a strategy like the New
Look.
When President Eisenhower took office, he was determined to reduce U.S.
defense spending when compared to the Truman Era.19 President Truman had overseen a
period of continued high defense expenditures, even after World War II, as a
consequence of the foray on the Korean Peninsula. Eisenhower was determined to
reduce defense spending because he held strong views that prodigal defense spending
would have detrimental effects on the U.S. economy, which in turn, could ultimately
destroy the American way of life.20 Eisenhower rationalized his leeriness of excessive
defense spending with cogent cause and effects on how profligate spending would alter
the foundations of American Society.
Eisenhower’s arguments followed the reasoning that defense spending would
create the establishment of a large defense-industrial complex which would be
underwritten by the U.S. government and influenced by special interests. In
Eisenhower’s view, special interests would lobby for and encourage higher defense
spending, creating larger deficits and increased inflation.21 In turn, larger deficits and
increased inflation would have negative impacts on the overall U.S. economy. Further, in
Eisenhower’s view, an economy where the defense sector made up a large portion of the
economy, when compared to other market sectors, was weaker than a more diversified
economy.22 Consequently, Eisenhower believed a weak U.S. economy would alter

19. Leighton, New Look, ii.
20. Garrity, “A New Look”.
21. Converse, Histroy of Acquistion, 393.
22. Ibid.
12

American Society with the introduction and implementation of governmental controls to
reinforce the economy.23 Ultimately, the introduction of economic controls and
government oversights would not only limit economic freedoms, but would serve as a
means to limit other freedoms, and thus threaten the American way of life.
In addition to the aforementioned arguments against excessive defense
expenditures based on values, Eisenhower had pragmatic reasons to oppose such
spending. He simply believed that high defense spending during peacetime was
inefficient and wasteful.24 He reasoned that defense spending, which prepared for
endless contingencies, would spiral out of control and create the problems mentioned
above. His views concerning defense spending may seem counterintuitive considering he
was a career military general who had commanded the Allies to victory in Europe during
World War II. Nonetheless, the quote below demonstrates Eisenhower’s personal
convictions.
Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired
signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed,
those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not
spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius
of its scientists, the hopes of its children...25
This excerpt demonstrates Eisenhower’s awareness of the direct and indirect
consequences of excessive defense spending. Although some may question the
genuineness of his statement because he used laborers and scientists to make nuclear

23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., 392.
25. “Quotable Quotes of Dwight D. Eisenhower”, Eisenhower National Historic Site,
accessed January 21, 2016, https://www.nps.gov/features/eise/jrranger/quotes2.htm,
paragraph 6.
13

weapons, this misses the point. The administration contrived the New Look to address
two important issues. On the one hand, the New look was intended to confront the Soviet
threat and on the other hand, the New Look was calculated to reign in defense spending.
Reigning in defense spending was an important issue to the Eisenhower administration
because the administration believed excessive spending could threaten the American way
of life. In the end, if the American way of life was transformed by the slow erosion of
freedoms it was no better than the ideology it was seeking to contain.
While the above views were the prevailing philosophy of the Eisenhower
administration, any solution to reducing defense spending would need to address the high
costs associated with manpower spending. The Eisenhower administration believed it
could overcome this obstacle by increasing U.S. reliance on the strategic nuclear arsenal
for security. By relying on nuclear weapons, costly manpower dollars could be saved and
security could be achieved.26 Therefore, an investment in nuclear forces would achieve
“maximum protection at a bearable cost”.27 Nuclear weapons were viewed by the
Eisenhower administration as a practical solution to its fiscal constraints.
In addition to fabricating a strategy that fit within Eisenhower’s fiscal limits, the
New Look was developed to confront Communism and the Soviet threat. Not only did
Eisenhower view a weakened economy negatively from the standpoint of altering the
American way of life, but he also saw it as inimical to American foreign policy. To
Eisenhower, a nation’s economic strength was the basis for a strong foreign policy and a

26. Converse, History of Acquistion, 393.
27. John Dulles, “The Evolution of Foreign Policy”, The Department of State Bulletin
XXX, no. 761, (January 25, 1954) : 107-110. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=msu.
31293008121345;view=1up;seq=110.
14

nation’s military strength was but one instrument of state power.28 Also, Eisenhower
believed that a strong economy was the driving force that made a well-equipped force
possible.29
Resistance to the spread of Communism was a perennial issue during the Cold
War and many are familiar with the aptly named Containment Doctrine that was a
hallmark of U.S. strategy during this period. The Containment Doctrine was introduced
in 1946 by the Truman administration following World War II and the U.S. elevation to
superpower status. A review of the Containment philosophy was ordered at the
beginning of the Eisenhower administration. In what is referred to as Operation
Solarium, three working groups were created to assess containment and offer fresh
perspectives to restrain Communism.30 While the three working groups each presented
separate recommendations, the proposal selected by President Eisenhower was a
continuation of Containment with some changes. A significant change to Containment
was to characterize the ideological and power competition between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union as a long-term struggle.31 Identifying the ideological struggle between the
U.S. and the Soviet Union as long-term meant the U.S. had to pursue a strategy that
balanced the protracted nature of the struggle against fiscal constraints. Therefore, it was
prudent to invest in cost-effective platforms with a prolonged deterrent value.

28. Leighton, New Look, 1.
29. Converse, History of Acquistion, 393.
30. Tyler Nottberg, “Once and Future Policy Planning: Solarium for Today,”
Eisenhower Institute at Gettysburg College, accessed April 1, 2016, http://www.
eisenhowerinstitute.org/about/living_history/solarium_for_today.dot, paragraph 8.
31. Leighton, New Look, 150.
15

Another outcome of Operation Solarium was that the U.S. changed to a slightly
more aggressive stance in its approach to undermining Soviet influence. This more
aggressive stance included the use of operations short of general war, like covert action,
sabotage, and physiological operations to undermine Soviet strength and influence.32 The
objective was to confront the Soviet threat and undermine Soviet influence at lower
levels on the conflict spectrum with the hopeful outcome being that these actions would
not lead to escalation. Also, it was held that escalation could be avoided with a strong
strategic arsenal that had a formidable deterrent value and an equally convincing
declaratory message. The struggle to contain communism was important for Eisenhower
because he viewed power and influence in zero-sum terms. To Eisenhower, losing
influence over one nation, even on the periphery, would erode U.S. influence in other
nations.33
While Eisenhower’s personal beliefs helped shape the New Look, it was historical
events and emerging technologies, like advancements in nuclear weapon technology, that
allowed the administration to pursue sweeping changes. However, a reduction in defense
spending to allow a nuclear build up would have been impossible without the cessation of
hostiles on the Korean Peninsula.
Eisenhower came into office in January of 1953 and an armistice was signed that
ended hostilities on the Korean Peninsula in July of the same year. While the peace
process had begun before he took office, the end of hostilities was not a foregone
conclusion during the first six months of his presidency. After his election, the peace

32. Nottberg, “Solarium for Today”, paragraph 14.
33. Garrity, “A New Look”.
16

talks began to falter. Eisenhower authorized an expanded bombing campaign and the
National Security Council discussed the tactical and strategic employment of atomic
weapons to end the conflict.34 It is unclear if expanded bombing and the hinted use of
atomic weapons weighed heavily on the parties’ decision to reenter negotiations and
ultimately accept a ceasefire agreement. Moreover, it is difficult to determine the resolve
of the U.S. to employ unconventional weapons to end the conflict. Although, the threat
to use unconventional weapons may serve as the harbinger for John Foster Dulles’s
January 1954 speech that introduced the declaratory policy of Massive Retaliation.
With the armistice in place, the administration was afforded the opportunity to
offer a cost reduction for its first budget proposal in 1954.35 Without an ongoing conflict,
easy savings would come from manpower cuts. In addition, with Eisenhower’s
Containment doctrine, that included efforts to undermine the Soviet Union with low
intensity operations, there was no need to fund a large conventional strength after
hostilities ended. However, reducing the budget by cutting manpower would not
automatically mean all manpower dollars could be saved. The development and fielding
of a nuclear strategic deterrent would also cost American taxpayers. In the end, while
Eisenhower was able to reduce defense expenditures when compared to the Truman Era,
he was not able to reduce spending to his desired amount.36

34. James Schnabel and Robert Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint
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Finally, an often overlooked factor that allowed the Eisenhower administration to
pursue the New Look was emerging technologies and scientific advancements. One
reason Eisenhower had so much faith in the New Look stemmed from his belief that the
U.S. would maintain technological superiority in the nuclear realm.37 In 1952 the U.S.
ushered in the nuclear age with development and corresponding test of a thermonuclear
weapon that had a blast yield of 10 megatons of TNT.38 For perspective, the atomic
bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had a blast yield of 15 and 20 kilotons of
TNT, respectively.39 Not only were thermonuclear weapons more powerful than the
previous generation of atomic weapons, thermonuclear warheads were smaller and lighter
than their atomic counterparts, without compromising destructive power. Additionally,
because of miniaturization, nuclear warheads could be attached to missiles; ushering in
the nuclear missile age.
Simultaneous to the advent of the thermonuclear weapons and missiles, new
technologies like the jet engine introduced new airframe platforms for delivery.40 A
major component of the New Look was that the U.S. arsenal would be deliverable by air
assets. Further, transmitters and homing devices were also being miniaturized which
greatly improved accuracy. Improved accuracy, coupled with the ability to produce
weapons with lower yields, meant that nuclear weapons could be employed in tactical
situations.41 Indeed, there were significant scientific advancements in nuclear weapon
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and associated technology, during the New Look period. These breakthroughs helped to
make it possible, as a policy, to rely on the U.S. strategic arsenal as a potent deterrent.
It is important to recognize that not only was the New Look developed as a
practical response to events and circumstances, it was also based upon President
Eisenhower’s tightly held principles. While the Eisenhower administration is often
remembered for Massive Retaliation, there was more thought behind this policy,
including the New Look, that is rarely acknowledged. The Eisenhower administration
followed a salient and transparent process to arrive at the New Look. Additionally, there
were other factors, like the cessation of hostilities and new technologies, that allowed the
administration to pursue the strategy. Indeed, the New Look oversaw a significant
transformation of the U.S. military to a nuclear fighting force. Further, this
transformation impacted many facets of the military’s traditional structure.

Outcomes, Consequences, and Lessons from the New Look
As with any grand strategy, the implementation occurred over time and the
consequences, both positive and negative would take time to surface. Reliance on the
nuclear arsenal for security and deterrence was pragmatic for fiscal, personal, and policy
reasons and it had impacts on the services. The Air Force was the greatest benefactor of
the New Look since the New Look placed importance on a nuclear arsenal deliverable by
airpower. From 1954-1960, the U.S. Air Force averaged 46.5% of the total defense
budget. While during the same period, the Army and Naval Service accounted for 25.3%
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and 28.2%, respectively.42 In contrast, from 1949 to 1953, the Air Force averaged 27.1%
of the budget, the Army accounted for 44.3% of the budget and the Naval Service
28.6%.43 In addition, to a larger percentage of the defense budget for the Air Force, the
number of aircraft and missile platforms capable of bearing a nuclear payload increased.
During the Eisenhower presidency, from 1953 to 1960, Strategic Air Command increased
the size of its fleet from 1,830 aircraft to 2,992 aircraft.44 Additionally, 1959 saw the
largest number of aircraft ever assigned to Strategic Air Command with 3,207 aircraft.45
While the U.S. also pursued other capabilities besides aircraft to carry nuclear payloads,
it was not until mid-1959 when the first land- and sea-based missiles began to augment
aircraft as strategic delivery options.
Unsurprisingly, one outcome of the New Look was that overall troop numbers in
the U.S. military declined from 3.3 million in 1954 to 2.5 million in 1960.46 In addition
to the overall troop levels declining, the U.S. Army reduced the number of its active
divisions from 20 divisions during the Korean War to 12 active divisions by 1956.47
Further, the reduction in the number of active duty Army divisions was accompanied by a
reorganization of the Army’s divisional structures into a pentomic division, that was
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geared toward fighting and sustaining in a nuclear environment, as well as, on the
conventional battlefield.48 Army leaders believed that the employment of tactical nuclear
weapons on the battlefield could help the Army achieve increased firepower while both
manpower and allocation to conventional ground combat forces were reduced.49 To meet
these demands, the Army shifted to a tactical nuclear force and developed numerous
tactical nuclear capabilities, like nuclear-tipped artillery rounds and Honest John
rockets.50 However, the Army was less fortunate when compared to the Air Force
because its shift to a tactical nuclear force accompanied a decline in the Army’s overall
budget from $16 billion in 1953 to $9.3 billion in 1960.51
In addition, the Army was proscribed from pursuing a strategic deterrent during
the New Look when a 1956 memo, from Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson,
discouraged the Army from planning the use of missiles beyond 200 miles was penned.52
Further, the same memo gave sole control authority to operate ground-based intermediate
range ballistic missiles to the Air Force.53 Interestingly, the Army nearly secured a place
of prominence in the New Look strategy with the development of the first ballistic
missile. However, the Army was forced to turn its missile over to the Air Force because
the Air Force was developing a similar missile and had already secured the preeminent
position within the New Look.54
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On the other hand, the U.S. Navy insulated itself from major cuts with the
introduction of the Forrestal-class aircraft carrier in 1954. The Forrestal-class carrier was
capable of accommodating new jet aircraft that could bear nuclear payloads, which
secured the Navy a strategic nuclear capability.55 In addition, the Navy sought nuclear
cruise missiles for its surface ships and ballistic missiles fired from its submarines. For
its part in the development of the nuclear triad, the Navy overcame an immense obstacle
in launching a missile from a submerged vessel. The submarine-launched ballistic
missile (SLBM), known as the Polaris missile system, came as a requirement in 1956 and
was tested at the end of the decade.56 Further, the Navy was a participant in nuclear
power which insulated it from New Look budget cuts. As early as 1955, the Navy had
fielded nuclear-powered submarines and its first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the USS
Enterprise, would set sail in 1960.57
One consequence of such a focused investment on nuclear weapons deliverable
by aircraft was the so-called missile gap. The Soviet Union performed two successful
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches in the fall of 1957.58 In addition to
successful ICBM tests, the Soviet Union launched the first satellite, Sputnik, into orbit in
October of the same year.59 To make matters worse, during the same time, the U.S. had
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two failed ICBM launch attempts.60 Soviet progress in missile technology shattered
Eisenhower’s belief that the U.S. would remain technologically superior. Most
concerning was that ICBMs upset the nexus between the time of attack and response.
Missiles can strike in a matter of minutes and cannot be recalled like aircraft. In addition,
aircraft must be scrambled and travel through enemy air defenses to reach the target. It
was not until almost two years later, in September of 1959, that the U.S. fielded its first
ICBM, the Atlas-D.61
The missile gap highlights an important consequence of the New Look and serves
as the first lesson. Technological superiority is difficult, if not impossible, to guarantee.
Confidence in your country’s prowess is important for any leader. But with confidence, a
leader should also be prudent to prepare for other scenarios where its prowess is
challenged. Of course, it was not in Eisenhower’s nature to prepare for other scenarios
because he eschewed defense spending that accounted for endless contingencies.
Eisenhower may be correct that endless preparation may result in overspending, but the
missile gap shows that it is wise to have a broader strategy with multiple capabilities.
Here, a balanced approach is best.
In addition to the missile gap, there were other consequences of a nuclear and
strategic aircraft centric strategy. At least one consequence of the New Look was interservice rivalry as each service vied for a portion of the defense budget and its unique
place in the strategy.62 Additionally, service roles and missions were complicated and
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contested with the introduction of new missiles.63 The Air Force benefited greatly from
the New Look, not only by securing a large portion of the budget, but also by attaining
the foremost position within the strategy. On the other hand, the Army had to prepare to
fight and sustain in a nuclear environment, which included developing tactical nuclear
capabilities, while receiving a smaller portion of the budget when compared to the Air
Force and its historical allocations. Here is another lesson to be learned; some interservice competition is healthy. However, this competition becomes unhealthy when
services are vying for funds to grow its importance within a strategy.
Another consequence of stressing the nuclear strategic deterrent was that the U.S.
lacked conventional capabilities. This gives rise to a noticeable quandary with the New
Look. The main purpose of the strategic nuclear arsenal was to deter Soviet aggression
and prevent escalation. Also, Operation Solarium introduced a more aggressive
Containment strategy which included subversive operations. However, New Look
investments in nuclear capabilities do not seem to be focused on conducting such
subversive operations. Admittedly, with a more aggressive check of the Soviet Union,
the U.S. was placing a great deal of weight on its strategic arsenal to prevent escalation.
This leaves one with the question, what would have happened if the Soviet Union
was not deterred from taking an action to confront the new U.S. Containment strategy? It
is difficult to project but the U.S. was preparing to conduct nuclear operations in the
event of general and limited conflict with the Soviet Union. Both the reliance on the
strategic arsenal and the Army’s integration of nuclear battlefield weapons to increase
firepower support this claim. U.S. and NATO forces would have only been a tripwire to
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a Soviet conventional invasion of Central Europe. The fact of the matter was that the
U.S. would have had no other recourse than to use nuclear weapons, strategic or
battlefield, in limited conflict or general war. Obviously, this reality helped to bolster the
threat of Massive Retaliation, but if the U.S. did not want to utilize nuclear weapons, it
may not have had another option. Of course, this quandary led to the Kennedy
administration’s strategy of Flexible Response in the next decade. The lesson from this
quandary is that it is beneficial to have multiple options at a leader’s disposal if
deterrence fails.
The New Look sought to reign in defense spending, and while the U.S. was able
to cut manpower spending, the U.S. still needed to fund the build up its strategic, theater
and tactical nuclear capabilities. For perspective, according to a Brookings Institution
study, the U.S. spent an estimated $5.5 trillion on the development, production, and the
systems to deliver, and defend against nuclear weapons from World War II to 1996.64 Of
the $5 trillion, 22%, or $1.1 trillion, was spent on nuclear programs from 1945 to 1960.65
In addition, it was noted above that even with manpower reductions, Eisenhower was
unable to reduce defense spending to his desired levels. This was because it cost more
than projected to develop the U.S. nuclear arsenal. This point gives rise to a very evident
lesson; Pentagon programs are often more expensive than first estimated.
Truly, the nuclear arsenal has been an expensive investment. Further, it is
difficult to determine the actual deterrent value associated with nuclear weapons.
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Whether the U.S. strategic arsenal deterred Soviet aggression is difficult to ascertain.
The fact that the Soviet Union and the U.S. avoided a nuclear exchange is not proof that
the New Look succeeded in deterring the Soviet Union. Then again, if the arsenal served
as an avenue for negotiations and meetings between the two nations to resolve issues and
thus avoid war, then nuclear weapons may have served an integral secondary purpose.
Most significantly, the first offset resulted in the foundation of the U.S. strategic
nuclear arsenal, including the nuclear triad, which continues to be a mainstay of U.S.
defense and security. While, strategies, policies, and views for the use of unconventional
weapons has evolved over time, the maintenance of a strategic arsenal has endured. The
strategic deterrent and nuclear triad continue to be discussed today. Further, the strategic
arsenal has paved the way for other policies, like extended deterrence, which is crucial
toward demonstrating U.S. commitment to its allies. Moreover, extended deterrence is
one way the U.S. contributes to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. It is doubtful
that the Eisenhower administration anticipated the long-term outcomes of the New Look.
The lesson to be taken from this reality is that strategies can have lasting impacts on the
U.S. defense culture. In addition, some ramifications cannot be foreseen by the initiators
of the strategy.
In conclusion, not only did the New Look fit the fiscal constraints of the
Eisenhower administration, it was a feasible strategy because the U.S. enjoyed an
advantage over the Soviet Union in nuclear weapon technology, during this period. As a
result of the New Look, the U.S. built up its nuclear forces, fielding and deploying B-52s,
ICBMs, and SLBMs. Because the strategy focused on the use of nuclear weapons, U.S.
conventional forces were intended to support nuclear operations. Unfortunately, the U.S.
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reliance on nuclear weapons in its defense strategy had drawbacks that would appear
after the Eisenhower administration had left the White House. Foremost, U.S. advantage
in nuclear weapon technology was brief and the Soviet Union quickly closed the nuclear
weapon technology gap.
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THE SECOND OFFSET

Introduction to the Second Offset
As defined by the Pentagon, the second offset was the period of time during the
1970s and 1980s when the U.S. invested heavily in precision guided munitions, long
range/stealth aircraft, intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance platforms.66 Unlike
the first offset period, that is clearly defined by the New Look, the second offset cannot
be attached to one administration or condensed to a sole strategy. On the contrary, the
second offset spanned twenty years and included multiple administrations and Pentagon
leaders. In addition, while the New Look relied on the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal for
security, the second offset sought to bolster conventional deterrence by outfitting
platforms and weapons with over the horizon technologies. Over the horizon or,
emerging technologies, would serve to increase battlefield awareness, capability, depth,
and scope to make U.S. conventional platforms more accurate, while simultaneously
reducing collateral damage and fratricide.
The above definition of the second offset is used by current Pentagon leaders
when introducing the third offset. It is important to recognize that this definition is
technology centric. An element the Pentagon definition omits, but was nonetheless
crucial to the success of the second offset, was the transformation of U.S. military
doctrines, warfighting concepts, and training that took place after the Vietnam War and
until the Soviet Union collapsed. Indeed, there were a few major military doctrines that
were promulgated during this time, the most prominent was the AirLand Battle Doctrine.
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These military doctrines accompanied a focused shift in U.S. military strategy away from
a counterinsurgency type conflict in Vietnam to confronting and deterring the Soviet
threat. In addition to military doctrines, the U.S. military transformed into an AllVolunteer Force while at the same time boosting military training.
As with the New Look, the second offset was influenced by external factors.
While the U.S. was concentrated on stemming Communist expansion in Southeast Asia,
the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies were undertaking significant modernizations,
both quantitatively and qualitatively, to its conventional and nuclear forces. These
modernizations were creating a growing imbalance, when compared to Soviet resources,
along the Inter-German border during the early 1970s. Further, during the 1970s the
Soviet Union achieved nuclear parity with the U.S. and then, quickly surpassed the U.S.
arsenal. These two factors placed serious doubts within the minds of U.S. leaders about
the balance of power. For example, a 1976 National Intelligence Estimate described the
strategic imbalance between the U.S and the Soviet Union as “sizeable” in favor of the
Soviet Union.67 According to the same document, the imbalance provided the Soviets an
increasing ability to “coerce at all levels of confrontation”.68
The efforts of the second offset were put on display in 1991, during the Persian
Gulf War, when the U.S. decimated the Soviet capabilities that comprised Saddam
Hussein’s military. The Persian Gulf War proved that the U.S. military’s integration of
emerging technologies into its platforms had been worthwhile. Additionally, the U.S.
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military established itself as the preeminent military power in the Post-Cold War security
environment. Indeed, the U.S. military underwent a dramatic transformation from the
Vietnam War to the Gulf War. This section will begin by describing the increasing
Soviet threat that compelled U.S. leaders to pursue changes beginning in the 1970s.
Next, this section will discuss the technologies, doctrines and training reforms that were
pursued and effectively changed the U.S. military. Finally, as in the first offset portion,
this section will detail any valuable lessons that can be garnered from this offset and
applied to the third offset.

The Two-Fold Soviet Threat
During much of the 1960s, the slow escalation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam
dominated the attention of U.S. leadership and the military enterprise. However, with the
U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in March 1973, the U.S. pivoted its attentions to the
increasing Soviet threat and possible conflict in Central Europe. As stated above, there
was a growing uneasiness over the U.S. ability to deter Soviet military action due to
Soviet conventional and nuclear modernizations. The qualitative and quantitative
improvements of the Soviet Union impacted U.S. perceptions concerning the balance of
power and the prevailing thought was that with nuclear parity, as well as numerical and
qualitative superiority, the Soviets would no longer be deterred from a conventional
invasion of Central Europe.69
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The 1973 Annual Defense Department Report, presented by then Secretary of
Defense Melvin Laird, stated that strategic realities had come into sharper focus because
Soviet buildups had gained greater “momentum” than was projected in the previous
year.70 For example, Secretary Laird pointed to a more rapid development than was
expected with regard to the Soviet submarine ballistic missile program.71 Additional
Soviet undertakings, identified in the report, included the identification of 100 new ICBM
silos, the continued construction of an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) site surrounding
Moscow, Soviet Naval and aircraft modernizations, and finally, two new Soviet battle
tanks that the U.S. believed were in production.72
Indeed from the end of the 1960’s, through the early 1970s, there were noticeable
increases in the number of Soviet ICBMs, SLBMs, and overall strategic launch
vehicles.73 In 1966, the Soviet Union had fewer than 400 ICBM launchers and by 1972
had almost 1,600 ICBM launchers at its disposal; whereas the U.S. remained constant
with just under 1,200 ICBM launchers from 1967 to 1972.74 In addition, the Soviet
Union increased from under 200 SLBM launchers in 1968 to over 500 by 1972.75 Similar
to its ICBM numbers, the U.S. remained constant with over 600 SLBM launchers from
1967 to 1972.76 As for strategic bombers, in 1972 the U.S. maintained over 400 strategic
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aircraft while the Soviet Union maintained fewer than 200.77 Overall, from 1963 to 1972
the U.S. maintained over 2,000 intercontinental strategic launch vehicles, while during
the same period, the Soviets increased from under 500 strategic launch vehicles to around
2,300.78
Not only had the Soviet Union expanded its strategic delivery vehicles during the
1970s, the Soviet Union also qualitatively improved its nuclear forces. Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s 1977 Annual Report to Congress outlines the major
qualitative gains in Soviet nuclear capabilities. From 1965 to 1976, the Soviet Union
developed seven new ICBMs compared to zero for the U.S.79 In addition, three of its
newest ICBM missile silos were hardened and the missiles had been outfitted with
multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV).80 It was believed that the
Soviet ICBM, the SS-19, was capable of carrying 8-10 MIRVs.81 Further, the Soviet
Union was developing a MIRV capability for its SLBM fleet, a new land-based mobile
ICBM launcher to augment its current mobile launcher, and had added a new long-range
bomber dubbed the “Backfire” to its suite of strategic capabilities.82 Finally, in 1978 the
Soviet Union surpassed the U.S. nuclear arsenal with an inventory of 25,393 warheads
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compared to the U.S. inventory of 24,243 warheads; this was the first time that the Soviet
nuclear arsenal was larger than the U.S. arsenal.83
Not only was the Soviet Union modernizing and expanding its nuclear arsenal and
capabilities, it was also modernizing and increasing its conventional capabilities. In the
1973 Defense annual report mentioned above, the Soviet Union had 160 divisions.84
Four years later, the number of Soviet divisions had increased to 170 divisions with 31
divisions and supporting aircraft located in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
Hungary.85 According to the 1977 Defense annual report, the Soviet military comprised
4.4 million people compared to 2.1 million in the U.S. Armed Forces.86 In addition,
Soviet conventional qualitative improvements were occurring across the board. The 1973
annual report outlines numerous new and developing aircraft and naval vessels.87
Further, the Soviet Union developed two new battle tanks, the T-64 and T-72, during the
1970s which were more sophisticated than the U.S. M-60 tank of the same period. The
M-60 Patton, which had been fielded in 1959, was little more than an upgraded Sherman
tank used in World War II.88
Quantitative parity was unfeasible during the Cold War for the U.S. and its allies.
Politically and fiscally the West was incapable of such an effort. Therefore, it was
imperative the U.S. pursue a different approach to offset its disadvantages. One solution
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to this dilemma was to exploit emerging technologies to increase the U.S. military’s
efficiency, effectiveness, and battlefield awareness. The integration of advanced
technologies within military platforms and weapons systems would act as force
multipliers to attenuate Soviet numbers. However, there were additional issues that
needed to be addressed if the U.S. was to rely on technology to offset the Soviet threat.
The U.S. would need to develop a new fighting doctrine that suitably applied the
advancements. Also, personnel changes and training improvements would be paramount
for the U.S. to capitalize on the integration of technology in its platforms and capabilities.

The Plan, the Challenges, and the Lessons
The technologies exploited to rectify the conventional imbalance were derived
from The Long Range Research and Development Planning Program, (LRRDPP). The
LRRDPP began in 1973 and was conducted by the Advanced Research Projects Agency,
the predecessor to today’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA.89
The LRRDPP was instrumental in identifying those capabilities that would yield a more
effective future force and resulted in a set of recommendations “deemed to be of strategic
importance to reshaping the battlefield of the future.”90 The scientific recommendations
included technologies that would enhance precision guided munitions, long range/stealth
aircraft, intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance platforms.
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The LRRDPP was the Cater administration’s contribution to the second offset as
it set the strategic vision and the technological foundation for platforms and capabilities
that were fielded in later years. An instrumental figure in the Carter cabinet was
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. Brown had a strong scientific and academic
background and authorized the development of stealth technologies to defeat enemy air
defenses.91 Additionally, he backed the development of the MX missile, which was
fielded in the subsequent administration, to replace the aging Minuteman and Titian
ballistic missiles.92 Also, instrumental in setting the technological foundation was the
continuity and support of Pentagon workers in the research and development branches.93
These members continued the technological pursuit regardless of whom was Secretary of
Defense or who was in the White House. The importance of this continuity cannot be
underestimated and is the first lesson to be garnered from the second offset. Pentagon
programs endure a byzantine process. From research and development, to testing and
evaluation. Once those phases are completed, the procurement and ultimately, fielding of
platforms and capabilities can occur. With such an intricate process, it is easy to see why
programs are contentious and incur budget and schedule overruns as contract
requirements are changed or updated throughout the process. Reforms and
transformations do not occur overnight and neither can capabilities be fielded as quickly.
Therefore, success relies on subsequent leaders’ dedication to back reforms throughout
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development to fielding. Also crucial is a permeation of the defense culture to sustain
reforms.
The U.S. pursued upgrades to its nuclear arsenal during the second offset, for
instance, the MX missile, however, it was relevant that advanced technologies be
integrated specifically for conventional capabilities. While nuclear weapons were a
staple of the defense culture at the time and were integral to deterrence and security, the
U.S. was conducting conventional interventions around the globe to thwart the spread of
Communism. The Soviet threat was global, not confined to the Inter-German border as
so often reminisced. Interventions occurred in Vietnam, the Middle East and as close as
Nicaragua in Central America, to name a few. Even Soviet operations, like the invasion
of Afghanistan which began in 1979, was a conventional operation. These conflicts show
that conflicts occurring around the globe were conventional in nature. Therefore, highly
efficient conventional capabilities were a practical response to the security environment
of the era. The importance of adopting platforms and capabilities commensurate to the
operations and missions being conducted is another lesson to be gleaned from the second
offset period. If the third offset is to succeed, it must pursue platforms and technologies
useful to the types of operations the U.S. will conduct in the future.
For example, as a result of U.S. emphasis on nuclear weapons for deterrence that
permeated the defense culture since the New Look, U.S. forces were trained and
equipped to fight a nuclear war; not a slow convention escalation which occurred in
Vietnam. The inadequacy of U.S. military platforms to conduct conventional operations
is best illustrated by the loss of aircraft the U.S. experienced during the conflict. The Air
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Force lost 385 out of a total 833 F-105’s.94 The Air Force F-105 was a fighter-bomber
originally designed as a nuclear attack aircraft during the New Look. Against Soviet
MiGs, over the skies of Vietnam, kill ratios for U.S. aircrews were a mere 2.4 to 1.95 For
perspective, in World War II kill ratios were 8 to 1 and the Korean War saw kill ratios as
high as 14: 1.96 These aircraft were designed for nuclear operations, not conventional
bombing, dogfighting, and close air support; the missions these airframes were
conducting over the skies of Southeast Asia. The number of losses can be directly
attributed to the New Look and the U.S. direction to pursue a robust nuclear arsenal to the
detriment of conventional purpose airframes.
As mentioned above, it was both a political and a fiscal impossibility for the U.S.
and its allies to match the Warsaw pact numerically. With the institution of the AllVolunteer Force in 1973, the U.S. was incapable of conscripting to meet Soviet strength
numerically. In addition, the transition to an All-Volunteer Force created a fiscal
constraint to meeting Warsaw Pact numbers. An interesting attribute of volunteer
militaries is that they are more expensive than conscript militaries. This happens
because, in order to recruit members, benefits such as health, pay, retirement, bonuses,
and schooling are increased to lure recruits.97 Benefits must also be increased to retain
members after an initial enlistment, in order to grow the senior enlisted and officer corps.
Yet another fiscal constraint was the economic downturn that resulted from the
Energy Crisis during the mid-1970s. This downturn portended the U.S. Department of

94. Kagan, Finding the Target, 25.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. U.S. Department of Defense, Secretary Laird’s Annual Report, 34-35.
37

Defense did not receive an increased budget during the second offset period.98
Additionally, because the U.S. military had to increase pay to its members, without an
increased budget, and confront the Soviet threat, advanced technologies offered a
solution to this complex fiscal dilemma. On the other hand, technology was not the only
solution to this challenge. The U.S. military alleviated some manpower issues when it
opened more non-combat military occupations to women and shifted some non-combat
duties to the reserve component.99
If the conventional and nuclear threat posed by the Soviet Union compelled the
U.S. to pursue reforms, it was political and fiscal realities that led the U.S. to select
technologically advanced capabilities as the solution to its dilemma. Indeed, there were
numerous technological innovations that greatly increased U.S. efficiency, effectiveness,
and awareness during the second offset period. These technologies were adapted to
platforms beginning in the 1970s and were fielded by the 1980s. The efficiency,
effectiveness, and awareness of technologically advanced platforms were compounded
with augmented training and doctrinal transformations.
Doctrinal transformations and training improvements began alongside the
LRRDPP in the early 1970s. The LRRDPP was not responsible for these transformations
and improvements occurred organically as the forces professionalized training and
doctrine. In 1973, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was
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instituted.100 The institution of TRADOC was an important development during this
period because it elevated the status of warfighting concepts and training as an important
feature of the military system. During this period, the first warfighting doctrine to be
announced by TRADOC was called Active Defense. The basic premise of Active
Defense was to quickly concentrate U.S. and NATO forces at Warsaw Pact breakthrough
points and scrap with Soviet forces to prevent a breakthrough.101 The principal drawback
with this doctrine was that it did not address follow on forces and other facets of the
Soviet military apparatus integral to conventional operations, like command and control
links. It was inconceivable that NATO and U.S. forces would be able to stymie Warsaw
Pact forces indefinitely without addressing second echelon forces and command, control,
and communication assets.
From Active Defense evolved the famous AirLand Battle Doctrine. The 1982
Army manual outlining the doctrine stated the U.S. Army should able to “fight
outnumbered and win”.102 Interestingly, the AirLand Battle Doctrine was based on
Soviet military philosophy, which viewed an enemy holistically and not as a collection of
individual units.103 This philosophy sought to destroy follow on forces and other
components of an enemy’s military system by attacking the enemy throughout its
defense, not solely on the front line. Because the Warsaw Pact had the numerical
advantage when it came to manpower, artillery, and tanks, the U.S. had to counterbalance
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the advantage with a doctrinal focus that took advantage of technological advances and
applied them to changes in the conduct of joint and service operational maneuvers. The
objective was to inflict enough losses on the enemy to undermine and overcome its
strength.
The U.S. AirLand Battle Doctrine exploited the concept of addressing an enemy’s
capabilities throughout its military structure to engage in close, rear, and deep
operations.104 AirLand Battle sought to reduce the Warsaw Pact second echelon forces
and destroy enemy command, control, and communication assets to cause the Soviet and
Warsaw Pact forces to be less effective by sending them into disarray. Technology
would be utilized, in a combination of platforms, with overlapping capabilities, in an
effort to improve NATO firepower.105 The objective was to see all targets on the
battlefield and be capable of destroying each target with one shot. The Airborne Warning
and Control System (AWACS) increased battlefield awareness, precision munitions
would help to reduce Soviet forces to manageable levels, and stealth aircraft capable of
defeating enemy radars would strike second echelon targets to relieve the front line.106
In addition to the doctrinal transformations, there were also training reforms.
TRADOC emphasized the importance of peacetime training because leaders believed
future conflicts would be quick engagements that would not permit the activation of a
civilian army in time to reach the conflict.107 Therefore, the standing All-Volunteer
Force had to be a well-trained and tested professional army. Training helped the military
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increase its performance before battle and it was fiscally advantageous. The Army
conducted a study and found that it was more expensive to replace a trained tank crew
than it was to field a new tank.108 Therefore, the tank was a battlefield instrument that
needed to ensure the survivability of the crew. TRADOC solved the conundrum of battle
testing its force without putting at risk lives and equipment. The Army introduced
National Training Centers or, NTCs, which were large swaths of land dedicated to force
on force training, simulations, and wargames.109 With the arrival of training tools, like
the MILES Laser System, force on force training become more realistic and the system
no longer relied on a referee’s judgment, but instead was controlled by impartial
computers.110 These training reforms allowed the force to obtain tactical and technical
proficiency before an actual engagement with the enemy. The result was that leaders saw
how tactics and platforms performed in almost real-life scenarios.
The air services were also rethinking training. Similar to the Army and its tank
crew study, the air services conducted its own study and found that most aircrews were
lost in the first 8-10 missions.111 The air service reckoned it could complete those first 810 missions under simulation, with realistic training, and increase the survivability of
aircrews and aircraft. The best reflection of this change was in 1972 when an elite pilot
training program was founded known as Topgun. Alongside training, aircraft platforms
were being rethought. The Air Force learned from its inadequate kill ratio over the skies
of Southeast Asia and broke up its airframe designs into smaller programs for specific
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purposes. Hence the development of the F-15 Eagle for air to air combat and the B-1
Lancer for bombing. Each airframe was designed for different missions and thus were
better prepared for those specific missions.112
The discussion about airframes offers an important insight for today concerning
the F-35 Lightning Joint Strike Fighter. In the 1970s and 1980s, the air services chose to
pursue different airframes for different missions. Today, the U.S. is pursuing platforms
designed for multi-roles. While in theory, a multi-role aircraft, that is co-developed by
the services, with minor changes to fit specific needs of the service, seems like an
effective way to save money, the program has been plagued with cost and schedule
overruns. These overruns can be attributed to the defense enterprise changing the
contract requirements and chasing the newest technology. Therefore, even today, a
platform with a multi-role mission may not be the best option to pursue due to the
bureaucratic process of development through fielding. In addition, a detractor of the F-35
could argue that if the fighter is intended to fulfill multiple roles, then it calls into
question the aircraft’s ability to adequately fulfill one of those roles.
An excellent case study that illustrates the crux of the second offset, the
technology, concepts, and overlapping capabilities, is the Army’s Big Five; the M1
Abrams tank, the M2 Bradley Infantry Vehicle, the Apache and Black Hawk helicopters
and the Patriot missile system.113 A significant historical event, that stimulated U.S.
thought during the second offset and generated the Big Five, was the Yom Kippur War of
1973.114 Interestingly, many U.S. officials believed that tank warfare had become

112. Ibid., 40.
113. Chapman et al., Prepare Army for War, 40.
114. Ibid., 39.
42

superannuated after this conflict. Combined, the Arabs and Israelis lost more tanks than
the U.S. possessed in Europe.115 The reason for the high loss of tanks in this conflict is
attributable to the use of anti-tank missiles which granted both belligerents standoff
distance to engage armor outside the range of the tank’s main gun. In addition, anti-tank
missiles were a potent firepower weapon because an armor resilient enough to protect
tanks did not exist.
However, the assumption that tank warfare was obsolete would prove to be
incorrect with the arrival of ceramic composite armor. The M1 Abrams took advantage
of ceramic armor which is lighter and stronger than steel allowing the Abrams a high
level of mobility and speed without sacrificing protection. In addition to the new armor,
the cannon was stabilized by a computer that accounted for speed, wind, elevation, and
other physical factors.116 Also, the tank round was greatly improved with the arrival of
stabilizers and penetration rods.117 Not only was the Abrams more resilient and more
potent than its predecessors, but the introduction of a suite of platforms would help the
U.S. military outclass adversarial forces.
The second platform in the Army’s Big Five is the infantry combat vehicle named
the M2 Bradley. The Bradley was designed with a smaller cannon and machine guns for
close-in fighting, as well as, the ability to transport infantry.118 Further, the M2 is
equipped with a TOW missile, granting the Bradley the capability to engage tank armor
at distance to protect the Abrams from anti-tank missiles, thus allowing the Abrams to
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close distance. The third platform of the Big Five is the AH-64 A Apache helicopter
built as an anti-tank capability to fly close to the ground in a high-intensity battle. The
Apache was delivered to units in 1983 and was later equipped with night vision and
sensing devices enabling the helicopter to fly in different types of environments.119 The
UH-60 A Blackhawk helicopter is a transport platform and is the fourth in the Big Five.
The Blackhawk is utilized to transport troops and equipment to and from the battlefield.
The last platform is the Patriot air defense missile which originally began as an anti-air
capability guided by computer and radar. The Patriot system was later developed into an
anti-missile capability to protect against tactical missiles like the Soviet SCUD missile.
The Big Five utilized unique technological advancements and were developed to work in
tandem and augment one another. These capabilities were ideal for AirLand Battle and
continue to be an impressive suite of capabilities that continue to be modified as needed.
The principal lesson to be learned from the second offset is that technology is not
a panacea. It enhances capabilities, but by itself, it does not have transformative powers.
It is in the hands of well-trained troops and utilized in well-thought operational concepts
that technologies flourish and the entire military enterprise benefits and advances. It is
difficult to assign greater or lesser value to any single pursuit in this transformation.
Without technology, the AirLand Battle Doctrine would not have been a feasible strategy.
Likewise, without doctrine and training, technology would not have been applied
systematically to the military enterprise. The nexus between technology, doctrine, and
training was an ecosystem of symbiotic relationships; each performed a necessary
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function and coalesced to produce a major transformation. Importantly, the second offset
period capitalized on new technologies and other reforms.
Secretary of Defense Brown would later reflect on the second offset period and
say “The Carter Administration initiated and developed these programs, the Reagan
Administration paid for their acquisition in many cases and the…Bush Administration
employed them.”120 Indeed, the second offset platforms and the accompanying
warfighting concepts were not employed against the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe.
While many leaders, strategists, and academics, on both sides, speculated the results of a
conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, it impossible to state with certainty the
outcome. On the other hand, the Persian Gulf War gives some insight into the return
value of second offset investments. The decimation of Saddam Hussein’s Soviet military
capabilities validated U.S. efforts.
While the Pentagon definition of the second offset period seems to end with the
collapse of the Soviet Union, it would be remiss not to mention advancements that
occurred following this period. Truly, second offset capabilities enabled the U.S. to step
into the role of the sole superpower after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The second
offset’s advanced technologies were used in conflicts and interventions in the early 1990s
in Iraq and the Balkans. Smart munitions are heralded in these campaigns because of
improved accuracy, collateral damage was mitigated. Original smart munitions were
optically guided, then laser guided, and now GPS guided.121 However, these controlled
operations would not have been possible without the integration of information

120. Grant, “The Second Offset”.
121. Ibid.
45

technology in the battle space that allowed U.S. forces to view the entire battlefield. A
main effort undertaken by the Army in the 1990s, was to multiply its information sharing
and communication ability by digitizing its force; viewing the battlefield in real time. 122
The importance of advanced technologies did not end with the turn of the century.
Within its first year, the Bush administration launched a “new triad” which placed
emphasis on conventional strike capabilities alongside unconventional capabilities, a
missile defense system, and a robust defense infrastructure. Further, the U.S. has relied
on technologies developed during the second offset for operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan over the past 15 years, including smart munitions and ISR platforms.
Although investments in the second offset began in the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. has
continued to evolve, both the technologies and strategies.
The U.S. continues to possess an operational advantage with the technologies and
platforms that were developed during the second offset. However, the U.S. advantage in
these technologies is eroding, therefore, the third offset is designed to address this
dwindling lead. It is not inconsequential that the U.S. has enjoyed an advantage in
second offset technologies for almost 40 years. In reality, after the fall of the Soviet
Union, there was no country, opposed to the U.S., that had the knowledge base and
infrastructure to challenge the U.S. advantage. As seen from the New Look, the U.S.
advantage in nuclear weapon technology was fleeting because there was a competitor
with the technological and intellectual base to challenge U.S. nuclear superiority. In
addition, the security environment of the New Look and second offset are starkly
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different from today’s. Further, the current offset is expected to compete in the future
security environment. Therefore, before introducing and analyzing the third offset, it is
important to describe elements U.S. planners predict will comprise the future security
environment.
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THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

If previous offsets have been pursued in response to specific threats, coupled with
the prevailing security challenges and environment of their respective eras, then it is
advantageous to detail the future security environment that the third offset is intended to
compete in. In addition, this is valuable because the success of the third offset hinges on
whether the major thrusts of this strategy are well aimed to confront future challenges.
Indeed, it is difficult to predict the future security environment and any threat projection
should be met with a certain amount of skepticism. Although threat forecasting is an
inexactable task, it is nonetheless useful to provide guidance and ensure U.S. forces do
not languish. Acknowledging the uncertainness of this task reinforces the need for
adaptable forces capable of confronting a myriad of emerging and unknown threats.
With the guidance of U.S. strategic documents, like the National Military Strategy,
National Security Strategy, and the Quadrennial Defense Review, future threats and
challenges the U.S. is envisaging can be gleaned.
In the 2015 National Military Strategy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
characterized the global security environment as the most unpredictable he has seen in his
40 years of service.123 According to the same document, the U.S. currently faces multiple
and simultaneous security challenges from many threat actors with a wide array of
capabilities. This has created a security environment that is complex and prone to rapid
changes. These rapid changes are fueled by a number of factors including demographic
shifts, globalization, altering power dynamics, and the diffusion of technology. These
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characteristics, indicative of the current environment, are expected to continue. Other
strategic documents echo the National Military Strategy in this view.
At first glance, it seems outside the scope of normal military preparation to
account for shifting demographics. However, this assumption is misplaced. According
to a Center for Strategic and International Studies assessment, which compiled
demographic data, the world population is expected to grow from the current 7.3 billion
people to 9.4 billion people by 2045.124 Most of this growth is expected to occur in
developing countries. Also, the population surge in developing countries will occur as
the populations of industrialized nations grow older. Further, the number of megacities,
defined as dense urban areas with a population more than 10 million people, will increase
from 29 to 40 by 2030.125
The impacts of demographic shifts on the future security environment are
numerous. One could imagine a future replete with food and water shortages, as well as,
energy crises. Resource shortages, coupled with a lack of economic opportunities caused
by population growth and the replacement of human jobs with technology, could foment
a large disaffected population that could easily destabilize a nation. The current refugee
crisis, triggered by the Syrian Civil War, offers an observation into impacts on the
security environment caused by demographic shifts. In the short term, the mass
migration of peoples to more stable, safe, and secure places in the West has raised
security concerns about vetting. In addition, if the millions of displaced people do not
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return to their homeland after the region stabilizes, the population could have a lasting
impact on the countries where refugees settle. The above scenarios are bleak results of
changing demographics. On the other hand, population growth, that is well managed,
could engender a new partner for the U.S. or the birth of a regional hegemon that is a
security provider for its region.
Of particular concern for military operations is the urbanization of the world’s
population. According to a United Nations study, 54% of people live in urban areas and
this percentage is expected to rise to 66% of the population by 2050.126 As mentioned
above, the number of megacities is expected to increase as well. As previous conflicts in
this, and past centuries have demonstrated, it is extremely difficult to conduct military
operations in urban environments. An organized, effective, and balanced military
operation in such an environment takes unique training and conditioning. Differentiating
between civilians, hostile actors that may not fall within traditional parameters as
combatants, and actual adversarial military forces, will become increasing difficult in the
future. Also, ingress and egress from these zones will require a collection of platforms
and capabilities that are suited to the urban environment.
Not only will the population increase, but the future population will also be more
connected. Globalization and the diffusion of technology have revolutionized
interactions amongst people, organizations, and governments, at all levels. Using digital
communication and social media, events and ideas spread quickly throughout the world,
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seemingly unencumbered by national boundaries. One can imagine a future security
environment ripe with the use of digital information. While globalization and the
diffusion of technology have positively impacted humankind, both have created unique
challenges for the U.S. military. For example, the diffusion of technology is challenging
the U.S. competitive advantage in military systems, like early warning and precision
strike capabilities. Three of the U.S. strategy documents acknowledge that the U.S. will
be operating in a future environment replete with sophisticated technologies like ballistic
missiles, unmanned systems, space, and cyber capabilities.127,128,129
Indeed, U.S. adversaries are developing the above capabilities to counter the U.S.
technological advantage to challenge U.S. power. Currently, China and Russia are
modernizing their respective forces to neutralize the suite of U.S. second offset
technologies. Moreover, the demonstrated use of second offset technologies and
platforms in conflict serve as both a model to emulate and a guide to overcome. Whether
from large states or small power brokers, there is no doubt that the U.S. will face
increasingly technologically capable adversaries in the future.
Although the National Military Strategy and other documents are cognizant of a
future where technology is more widespread to a range of actors, these documents do not
mention efforts to curtail the diffusion technology. While the U.S. continues to support
counterproliferation and nonproliferation sentiments efforts with respect to ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction, the strategy documents do not mention
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sentiments to stem the diffusion of technology. To the contrary, an element of building
stronger relationships with allies consists of assisting allies and partners with developing
their own technologically adept forces.130 The goal of this effort is to increase the
deterrent and fighting capability of allies and partners resulting in increased security
overall. While increased security and strengthened relationships are positive, at least one
drawback is the creation of an additional avenue to diffuse technology. This could mean
that adversaries may be able to access proprietary U.S. technology sooner.
Not mentioned in the overarching strategy documents, but important to mention,
are emerging technology sectors that are believed to offer an opportunity for any actor
that can harness the scientific powers of these sectors to fabricate revolutionary
capabilities. The most notable are the biotechnology and nanotechnology sectors. A
variety of states, large and small, wealthy and less wealthy, have set in motion
government-backed initiatives aimed at developing these sectors to upset the traditional
balance of power.131 What makes these sectors appealing is that the threshold; cash,
knowledge, and infrastructure, for these type of technology centers is less when
compared with other types of technologies, like nuclear. Essentially, it is easier for less
advanced states to compete with more advanced nations to research, develop, and
ultimately breakthrough, in these sectors. This shows that not only is the diffusion of
technology an element of the future security environment, but also research and
development will be more competitive and will not be solely reserved for states with
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large defense-industrial enterprises. This could signify that smaller countries may
become more empowered in the future.
An added element of these technologies that has ramifications for the future
security environment is the dual-use nature of these programs. Both nanotechnology and
biotechnology have applications in the civilian and military worlds.132 For example, a
biotechnology center studying a cure for a disease could also covertly be enhancing the
lethality of biological warfare agents. Or a nanotechnology center could quickly convert
research from civilian applications to military uses in a time of national emergency. The
dual-use characteristic of these technologies creates the need for better intelligence to
discover any furtive motives of these programs. However, the ability to adequately
review each program may be an insurmountable task based on the number of such centers
increasing around the world.
While things may appear differently in the future, U.S. strategy documents assert
that nation-states will remain the international system’s dominant actors in the future
security environment.133 This prediction seems to be based parochially in that it is
difficult for the current generation to imagine the Westphalian power structure ending.
Although, this prediction has been strengthened by recent events; namely the Brexit vote.
There seems to be growing push back against international organizations and their ability
to regulate member nations’ powers. However, it is difficult to extrapolate this sentiment
as enduring or ephemeral.
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Indeed, there are some revisionist states attempting to create new international
norms and behaviors, as well as, new centers of power using unique methods to
undermine the traditional system. For instance, the Russian sponsored invasion of
Crimea has utilized overlapping state and non-state violence where the actors have
blended techniques, capabilities, and resources.134 This type of overlapping techniques is
referred to as hybrid conflict and has become common to the vernacular of the security
and defense communities. A feature of hybrid conflict is that it creates ambiguity as to
the threat actor’s actual and perceived involvement and thus complicates decision making
for any actor wishing to combat hybrid conflict. In addition, hybrid warfare offers the
aggressor a way to circumvent international organizations by allowing the aggressor to
deny the breadth and depth of involvement and support.135
On the other hand, China is employing what some refer to as lawfare; using or
misusing law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational
objective.136 By using existing international law, China is attempting to redraw its
territorial boundaries by reclaiming disputed islands, reefs, and atolls in the South China
Sea. This territory is highly contested due to its numerous resources and strategic value.
Not only is the Sea believed to contain an abundant oil and gas reserve, a significant
amount of the world’s shipping traffic passes through the South China Sea. By claiming
and occupying these islands, China could use international norms to extend its territorial
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waters to encompass the South China Sea in its entirety.137 Whether through hybrid
warfare or lawfare, what can be projected is that these types of strategies will continue to
be employed in the future security environment if states can achieve goals and objectives
through these methods.
While states will most likely remain dominant actors in the international system,
non-state actors like violent terrorist organizations will continue to be prevalent. Military
incursions and operations, led by the West and its allies, to combat extremism in the
Middle East, North Africa, and Southeast Asia have remained steady. These operations
have remained steady despite a more than decade-long battle with terrorist affiliates in
Iraq and Afghanistan, by the U.S. and its partners. Terrorism has been utilized as a tactic
for centuries; therefore, it is unlikely to be eliminated. Two mistakes are often made
when appraising terrorism in today’s security environment that must be rectified for the
future security environment. First, that terrorism is a phenomenon associated solely with
Islam and initiated by the 9/11 attacks. In reality, the U.S. and allies have been dealing
with Islamic extremism for decades before September 11, 2001. Therefore, it is
important to widen our historical perspective when examining the threat posed by
terrorism. Second, it is wrong to assume that any ideology can be eradicated in a few
years with military operations. Kinetic operations are not the only way extremism should
be stemmed.
While shifting global demographics, the diffusion of technology, new power
brokers, and unique methods of conflict are expected in the future security environment,
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the third offset must also fulfill mainstays of U.S. strategy. Indeed, there are certain
predominant objectives that have endured as pillars of U.S. defense strategy since World
War II. These enduring objectives have weathered numerous administrations, leaders,
budgets, and many other changes. Most likely, regardless of external and internal
pressures, the U.S. will remain a global power with global interests. Therefore, the third
offset must fulfill these enduring pillars.
The key strategic mainstay of U.S. strategy is to deter aggression, and if
deterrence fails to deny the adversarial objectives and ultimately defeat the enemy. While
the terms, “deter”, “deny” and “defeat” go through minor iterations depending on
leadership, the principle is the same; confront aggression and secure American interests.
The second foundational principle of U.S. strategy is to strengthen relationships with
allies and partners. A considerable piece of building and maintaining strong relationships
comes from the U.S. forward deployed presence. Forward deployed assets demonstrate
U.S. commitment to allies and establishes the U.S. in a more advantageous position to
achieve the first objective. It is unrealistic to believe that these hallmarks will undergo
drastic changes in the future. Thus, the third offset must be geared toward ensuring these
essential objectives.
Less essential, but still foundational hallmarks of U.S. strategy, are to support the
spread of democracy and maintain the All-Volunteer Force. The U.S. has long supported
emerging democracies and the desire to export democratic processes and ideology. At
least one unintended consequence of supporting democracies is that democracies can
change orbits with the election of new leaders. The U.S. is experiencing this in the
Philippines. As the U.S. supports the export of democracy, it must appreciate that the
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strength of alliances can ebb and flow, but it must support the direction that the partner
country has chosen. It is an exercise in statecraft to demonstrate that even democratic
nations can have differences but those differences are not drastic enough to engender
violent conflict.
In order to meet these hallmark objectives, the military outlines priority missions.
These missions are to maintain a safe and secure nuclear deterrent, provide military
defense for the homeland, defeat an adversary, provide a global stabilizing presence,
combat terrorism, counter weapons of mass destruction, deny adversary objectives,
respond to crisis, conduct military engagement and security cooperation, conduct stability
and counterinsurgency operations, provide support to civilian authorities and finally,
conduct humanitarian and disaster relief.138 Indeed, this is a litany of “priority” missions.
In short, the U.S. military must be capable of conducting a multitude of missions, across
the spectrum of threats.
With a litany of diverse missions, the U.S. must be adaptable to changing
situations and be prepared to conduct any mission around the globe. To this end, the
strategy documents state the U.S. should be capable of swift and decisive force
projection.139 Many strategy documents delineate what the Joint Force should stress to
accomplish swift and decisive force projection, to address priority missions, and to
achieve essential objectives. First, the Joint Force seeks the best and the brightest
Americans for its ranks.140 Second, the U.S. seeks investments to counter anti-access and
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area denial (A2AD) capabilities, space, cyber, and hybrid threats.141 These investments
include, space and earth-based indications and warning systems, integrated and resilient
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, strategic lift platforms, long-range
precision weapons, missile defense technology, undersea systems, remotely operated
vehicles, special forces, and a Cyber Mission Force, among others.142
One may notice that the two elements the Joint Force seeks closely align with the
three thrusts of the third offset strategy. The only thrust missing is the development of
operational concepts. These strategy documents, which were released after the unveiling
of the third offset, show that the third offset is currently underway. Indeed, the services
are pursuing some incredible technologies geared toward alleviating impacts of the future
security environment. Many technologies and concepts are beginning to be tested and are
close to fielding. While similar to previous offsets in many ways, the third offset also has
many unique attributes. In addition, there are other endeavors that are being pursued in
conjunction with the third offset to facilitate the implementation of the bold strategy.
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THE THIRD OFFSET

Introduction to the Third Offset
To face the challenges of an uncertain and unpredictable future security
environment, as well as, to address the dwindling U.S. technological advantage, the U.S.
is pursuing a new strategy. The third offset strategy is aimed with advancing cuttingedge technologies for use in military applications, developing operational concepts to
maximize the utility of cutting-edge technologies, and finally with retaining the best and
brightest Americans for service in the U.S. military. There is not one preeminent
document that outlines and delineates the strategy in its entirety. To the contrary, much
of the information concerning the third offset comes from speeches and interviews with
top Pentagon officials. In addition, major tenets of the third offset strategy can be found
in many key U.S. strategy documents. Further, the services are actively pursuing new
operational concepts while, researching, developing, and testing cutting-edge
technologies. The direction to move forward has been given and the strategy has
permeated the U.S. military enterprise.
Indeed, the three major thrusts of the strategy offer innovative ways to improve
the military enterprise and enhance warfighting capabilities. From the Navy’s
electromagnetic railgun, with offensive and defensive applications, and advanced
manufacturing like, 3-D printing, that has the potential to simplify the complexities of
supply chains and logistics. Both capabilities, and many others are cost effective
breakthroughs that offer pioneering ways to ensure U.S. military dominance. Operational
concepts are utilizing Artificial Intelligence (AI) and autonomous systems to augment the
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human decision-making process. Machine power augmenting human performance is
believed to offer the greatest impact for the third offset period.143 In today’s
interconnected world, the young men and women growing up with technology are
tomorrow’s warfighters. Therefore, efforts are in motion to recruit the next generation of
technologically adroit warfighters.
With a myriad of threats and a diverse range of operations, the third offset is not
intended for one adversary but is intended to blunt multiple military competitors. While
still in its emergent stages, new technologies, warfighting concepts, and highly trained
warriors are geared toward modernizing and leaning out the military.144 In addition, the
strategy is not intended to fight future wars but to deter future conflict. The Pentagon
views the diminishing U.S. technological lead as a threat to U.S. deterrence. Therefore,
the purpose of the third offset is to develop these thrusts to maintain U.S. military
superiority and ensure peace through a strong conventional deterrence.
Moreover, this strategy is expected to be a continuous assessment and
development. The U.S. no longer expects to have a monopoly on a technological
advantage for 40 years, thus, the third offset is focused on sustaining the technological
lead in short-term increments of three to five years.145 This may seem like an
unattainable development regimen for a bureaucratic morass like the Department of
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Defense. However, the organization has acknowledged its shortcomings, with regards to
business practices, and the third offset strategy is part of a larger Department wide
initiative. Other initiatives and reforms in areas like, audits and procurement, are
intended to support the third offset to reduce barriers and impediments.
Truly, the third offset is an ambitious strategy and this section will begin by
introducing the third offset and its three major aims. In addition, this section will discuss
some of the accompanying initiatives that are intended to strengthen the third offset. This
strategy has been liberated from the philosophical debate and has produced tangible
results. Therefore, this section will provide a brief overview of various undertakings for
each aim.

The Third Offset Strategy
As mentioned above, much of the information that has been released concerning
the third offset strategy has come from speeches, testimonies, and press releases from
Pentagon leaders. In addition, since the strategy is still in its early stages, it can be
difficult to locate information outside Pentagon sources. This offers benefits including,
obtaining information directly from the source. Of course, with only one avenue to glean
information, at least one drawback is biasness. Also, because the strategy is incipient, it
is fluid and continues to take form. Fluidity offers the Department of Defense the ability
to adapt the strategy to pressures from the changing security environment and emerging
security challenges.
The third offset strategy was introduced in 2014 as part of a larger U.S.
Department of Defense initiative. Laid out in the keynote address before the Reagan
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National Defense Forum, former Secretary of Defense Hagel announced the Defense
Innovation Initiative. The foremost goal of this initiative is to terminate the loss of the
U.S. technological advantage to ensure the U.S. maintains a robust and effective
conventional deterrence. This extensive initiative is aimed with;
1) Developing cutting-edge technologies by focusing on fields such as robotics,
autonomous systems, miniaturization, analyzing big data, and advanced
manufacturing, like 3-D printing.
2) Exploring new operational concepts and approaches to warfighting by
utilizing the cutting-edge technologies developed.
3) Acquiring and retaining the best and brightest minds to pursue the previous
objectives.146
In short, technical innovation, coupled with the development of operational concepts and
doctrine, will produce the third offset strategy. According to the figurehead behind the
third offset strategy, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work, the offset strategy
utilizes U.S. advantages to offset, or undermine, adversarial advantages.147
The third offset strategy is intended to address the long-term security of the U.S.
by addressing current instabilities while simultaneously, planning and preparing for
future threats and the future security environment. In addition, the U.S. views adversarial
advancements and modernizations as efforts to blunt the U.S. technological edge. Both
Russia and China are modernizing their military capabilities on a trajectory to become
U.S. peers. In addition, these modernizations can be thought of as an adversarial offset
strategy aimed at undermining U.S. strengths, mainly U.S. technological superiority and
expeditionary force projection. The third offset is intended to respond to the “adversarial
offset”.
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The U.S. technological lead is dwindling and is best illustrated by outlining
technologies, modernization regimes, and platforms that growing powers are seeking
which include; advanced aircraft, submarines, longer range and more accurate cruise and
ballistic missiles, anti-ship missiles and counter space, cyber, and electronic warfare
capabilities.148 Advanced aircraft, like the new Chinese fifth-generation fighter and the
Russian fifth-generation fighter under development, are intended to weaken U.S. air
supremacy. In addition, China has christened five new Luyang-III class guided missile
destroyers that carry its “carrier killer” missiles.149 Russia has recently deployed a new
cruise missile, dubbed the SSC-X-8, that the U.S. contends violates the IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces Treaty.150 Longer range and more sophisticated ballistic and
cruise missiles, like the Chinese “carrier killer” and the new Russian cruise missile,
threaten the U.S. homeland and the U.S. forward presence to limit U.S. involvement
during tense situations or a conflict.
Another way U.S. adversaries are seeking to offset U.S. strengths is by targeting
information and other electronic networks the U.S. utilizes in every operation. In
addition, the electronic and computer infrastructure are vulnerable to exploitation and a
successful attack can undermine U.S. military effectiveness.151 Therefore, adversaries are
developing and, in some instances, have already utilized, informationalized warfare
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capabilities, like cyber-attacks. Numerous examples abound from North Korea’s hack of
Sony Pictures, to China’s theft of information from the U.S. Office of Personnel
Management, to Russia’s Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack against Estonia in
2007. Cyberattacks and network intrusions are difficult to defend against because they
materialize at the speed of light along fiber optic cables and are not confined by
geographic or other physical boundaries.152 In addition, attribution of intrusions and
attacks in cyberspace are complicated in that, the actor can easily obfuscate its location
and conceal its motives.153
Because U.S. adversaries are developing asymmetric capabilities in every domain,
the U.S. must be prepared to conduct and combat operations across all domains; land,
sea, air, space, and cyberspace. Further, while the examples above pertained to states,
today’s technologies are evolving rapidly, are no longer reserved for actors with defense
infrastructures, and are easily accessible to a range of actors.154
For the past forty years, the U.S. has held a monopoly on technologies that were
developed during the second offset. Many competitors have observed how the U.S. has
utilized those technologies in operations and are seeking to emulate and implement those
capabilities in their own military enterprise. Further, because the use of such
technologies has been optimized, adversaries have recognized advantages and
weaknesses. The well-established nature of the current suite of U.S. platforms, in
military operations, gives adversaries insight to undermine the U.S. advantages.
Although the use of U.S. platforms and capabilities is well-known, the third offset is not
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solely about introducing new and expensive platforms. A large element of the offset is to
upgrade and integrate cutting-edge technologies into existing platforms, thus, creating
new or enhanced capabilities.155
The core issue with adversarial modernizations and development of asymmetric
capabilities is the U.S. ability to conventionally deter adversaries and growing power
states may be called into question. Therefore, the Department of Defense views the
dwindling U.S. technological edge as an erosion of the value associated with the U.S.
conventional deterrent.156 Thus, it is an imperative that the U.S. respond with
investments in innovation and reforms at present to maintain a lead ahead of any potential
gains from an adversary. The third offset is intended to give U.S. warfighters every
advantage over potential enemies.
Moreover, this strategy is expected to be a continuous assessment and
development. Again, the U.S. no longer expects to have a monopoly on a technological
advantage for 40 years. Thus, the third offset is focused on sustaining the technological
lead in short-term increments.157 In explanation, the U.S. is seeking to implement the
three aims to gain the operational advantage in the next three to five years. Once that has
been completed, the U.S. will begin anew to develop and implement innovations to
ensure the advantage for the next period of years, and so on. In the end, the U.S. is
attempting to restrict its adversaries’ ability to compete by continually remaining at the
forefront. These short-term cycles are intended to have long-term ramifications.
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To maintain a rapid cycle and lower obstacles to innovation, the third offset is
accompanied by other Department of Defense programs directed to streamline Pentagon
business practices. In addition, the Pentagon has acknowledged that many of today’s
cutting-edge technologies are developed outside the traditional defense apparatuses.
Technological advances are occurring in the private sector for commercial uses. To
acquire these technologies, the Pentagon has increased investments outside the familiar
defense companies. Furthermore, to foster a greater collaborative relationship between
the government and the technology industry, the Pentagon has opened outreach offices in
Silicon Valley and in other burgeoning technology cities.

Accompanying Initiatives
The Defense Innovation Initiative is a department wide effort to identify and
invest in ways to sustain and advance U.S. military dominance in the 21st Century.158 To
this end, other reforms and innovations, outside technologies and operational concepts,
are integral if the third offset is to succeed. U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Cater
explained, in his statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee on the FY 2016
Department of Defense Budget, the chief area where the military enterprise needs
reforms are in its business practices.159
To remain competitive Secretary Carter stated the Department of Defense needs
to curb wasteful spending and be accountable for expenditures, as cost overruns hurt
public trust.160 It may be difficult to believe but the Department of Defense has never
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undergone a Department wide audit. However, the National Defense Authorization Act
of 2010 requires the Department to have its full financial statements audit-ready by
September 30, 2017.161 According to a Department of Defense audit readiness document,
the organization is continuing its efforts to meet this goal and audits have been
instrumental in assisting the enterprise to review its business practices and management
systems.162
In addition to audits, programs like Better Buying Power are other initiatives the
organization is pursuing to streamline and review and its business practices. Better
Buying Power, now in its third iteration since 2010, is a Department of Defense mandate
“to do more without more.”163 It is intended to strengthen the Department of Defense’s
buying power by implementing a series of reforms to control the costs of programs
through competition, incentives, and curtailing the bureaucratic process. Better Buying
Power focuses on affordable programs, controlling costs throughout capability life-cycle,
incentivizing productivity in government and industry, eliminating unnecessary and
unproductive processes in the bureaucracy, promoting competition, and improving the
professional and knowledge of the acquisition workforce.164 By controlling costs and
reducing fraud, the Department of Defense can reallocate defense dollars to pressing
challenges. In addition, a mandate like Better Buying Power will ensure third offset
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technologies and innovations reach the warfighter rapidly by reducing obstacles to
acquisition. Smooth acquisition cycles will be key if the third offset is to achieve shortterm development cycles and sustain with the quick pace of technological development.
Technological developments are no longer occurring solely at the government
level; many advances are occurring in the private sector for commercial use. To remain
competitive in the current development environment, the Department of Defense
instituted its own start-up called the Defense Unit Innovation Experimental or, DUIx.
According to its mission statement, the Unit is a bridge between those in the U.S.
military, conducting national security missions, and companies operating on the cuttingedge of technology.165 This Unit has locations in technology hubs like Silicon Valley,
Boston, and Austin to be near private sector developers to accelerate technology into the
hands of military warfighters.166 This outreach reinforces the third offset by enabling the
organization to have access to developers producing cutting-edge technologies.
In addition to outreach and business practice initiatives, the Department of
Defense also wants more freedom in its fund allocation. Congressional oversight is an
important function, however, there are ways the Pentagon feels this relationship can be
improved. Most importantly, the Pentagon believes the Budget Control Act of 2011
should be repealed.167 According to the Pentagon, unpredictable budgets and continuing
resolution spending bills are detrimental to the enterprise overall and deleteriously impact
the research and development portion of the budget on a greater scale.168 Also, the
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Pentagon seeks another round of Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC) because the
organization is operating at 25% higher capacity than it needs.169 Another contentious
issue is the retirement of aging platforms and capabilities. For a number of years, the
organization has been attempting to retire the A-10, however, Congress continues to fund
the platform. At the crux of this issue is the organization wants Congress to trust the
Department of Defense that it is making the correct decision with respect to its base
closures and retirement schedules. Indeed, cutting overhead spending and retiring aging
platforms would facilitate the third offset by funding the strategy’s aims and
accompanying initiatives.

Examining the Three Aims: Cutting-Edge Tech, Operational Concepts, and
Retention
As outlined above, the third offset consists of three major aims. The first aim is to
develop cutting-edge technologies by focusing on fields such as robotics, autonomous
systems, miniaturization, analyzing big data, and advanced manufacturing, like 3-D
printing. Certainly, many advancements in these fields have taken place in recent years.
Although, the notable advancements in autonomous systems have been in the arena of
operational concepts and will be discussed in more detail subsequently.
Miniaturization is an interesting technology to examine because it entails more
than producing smaller and more powerful computer chips. A prime example of how
miniaturization is being utilized can be found in the electromagnetic railgun system. The
electromagnetic railgun can hurl a 24-lb projectile, named the hypervelocity projectile

169. Ibid.
69

(HVP), at Mach 7 over 100 nautical miles, using solely electricity.170 In comparison to
the Navy’s current deck gun, the HVP has over seven times the range and is three times
faster and lighter.171 The railgun’s smaller and lighter rounds permit more projectiles to
be stored on a ship when compared to conventional rounds. Therefore, the HVP has the
potential to increase space, a precious commodity aboard a vessel, for other capabilities
and platforms. In addition, the HVP is not a combustion round and relies solely on the
speed of the projectile to destroy the target.172 This characteristic of the HVP minimizes
the risk associated with storing the projectile. Further, the electromagnetic railgun may
upset the current missile defense quandary because of the inexpensiveness of each fire
sequence when compared to the cost of current missile interceptors. The prototypes are
said to be capable of firing 10 rounds a minute at a meager cost of $25,000 per shot.173
By comparison, the SM-3 Block IA and IB interceptors cost between $12 million to $15
million and the new interceptor, being developed between the U.S. and Japan, costs
between $20 million and $24 million.174 Fast reloads and a deep magazine on the railgun
grants increased shot opportunities on target at an affordable cost. The railgun’s
sustained firing may help to reduce the effectiveness of new sophistication techniques on
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adversary’s ballistic missiles, like multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles
(MIRV) and salvo launches.
The utility of 3-D printing, sometimes referred to as additive manufacturing, in
future operations is straightforward. Advanced manufacturing would simplify replacing
lost, missing, or broken parts for equipment. Ostensibly, it would greatly reduce the need
for large inventories of spare parts. In addition, additive manufacturing could reduce
costs in a variety of ways. With less need for physical warehouse and storage space,
overhead dollars could be reallocated. Additionally, the military could save on
procurement by not spending large sums on storing parts that may never be used. Having
the ability to replace parts on a one-to-one and as needed basis would be a great benefit.
In addition, additive manufacturing would simplify the supply chain and logistics,
as well as, the costs of shipping parts. An almost non-existent supply chain would assist
units conducting missions in underdeveloped locales that lack an infrastructure. Further,
as a unit deploys it can leave non-essential replacement parts behind making the unit
lighter for a more rapid force projection. This innovative technology could transform
military supply chain and logistics and the bureaucratic procurement process. This
technology is beginning to enter the military enterprise. For example, an MV-22B
Osprey flew a trial mission with a flight essential part fabricated by additive
manufacturing.175 On a lower scale, an Air Force unit manufactured brackets to hang
signs, using a 3-D printer, which lowered the cost of the bracket by 88%.176
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At first sight, analyzing big data evokes notions about government spying
programs. In truth, major advances in analyzing large amounts of data could greatly
increase U.S. intelligence and information gathering. There is a wealth of information
online and with the rapid sifting of data, the U.S. could glean valuable information about
adversarial troop movements, training, and equipment. This ability is predicated on the
ubiquitous use of social media platforms by service members around the globe. Further,
there has been a demonstrated use of an algorithm that specifically followed social media
profiles and created a timeline of flight MH17; the Malaysian passenger plane that was
shot down over Ukraine in July 2014.177 This timeline sifted through open source social
media platforms and found pictures of the plane taking off and a Russian SA-11 missile
battery in the vicinity where MH17 was shot down, with all its missiles. The next picture
in the timeline revealed a contrail emanating from near the location of the Russian missile
battery. Another picture showed the same missile battery, confirmed by serial number,
leaving the area and lastly, a picture of the SA11 battery entering Russian.178 While this
does not prove beyond a shadow of a doubt Russian military involvement, it does
demonstrate the value of intelligence gathering through social media platforms, and the
utility of tracking adversarial movements through cyberspace.
In addition, this type of sifting requires learning machines that can be taught to
identify patterns and objects. Until 2015, a human analyst was more effective at
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identifying objects than a machine.179 Now machines can identify objects more
accurately and more quickly than humans. While big data analytics could be used to
acquire, analyze, and distribute intelligence and information about an adversary, there are
other practical applications. Salvo ballistic missile launches are of concern for the U.S.
With hundreds of enemy missiles incoming, big data would be able to track the trajectory
of many missiles and use interceptors sparingly to destroy only the missiles that will
harm friendly assets; not the missiles that may fall harmlessly into the ocean.180
Learning machines that analyze large amounts of data takes advantage of
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and autonomous systems. These developments are also
producing the primary operational concepts to result from the third offset thus far, like
human-machine collaboration and teaming. It is helpful to provide a quick overview of
terms that are often applied to today’s emerging technology. Autonomy is the delegation
of a decision authority to an entity to act within specific parameters.181 An entity in the
battlespace with autonomy can be a human or a computer. However, no machine or
human has full autonomy, considering orders are prescribed through the chain of
command. An autonomous capability means the entity (human or machine) can
independently select an action, to accomplish goals, based on the entity’s knowledge and
understanding of the world, itself, and the situation.182
So-called “autonomous systems” utilize Artificial Intelligence, which is the
capability of a computer to perform a task that is usually reserved for human
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intelligence.183 In essence, by expanding the use of AI within machines, humans are
ceding more tasks to machines. Interestingly, learning machines and AI differ from
robots because a robot is simply a machine that completes a determined and defined task,
function, or duty. It is not capable of autonomy or decision-making within its purview.
Human-machine cooperation is guided by the idea that a human and computer
team is more effective at solving problems than either a human or computer team alone.
For example, in 2005, two amateur chess players, utilizing three computers, beat a cadre
of Grand Champion human chess players and another cadre of supercomputers.184 In
human-machine collaboration, the human is the strategic thinker and the computer
processes information quickly and presents tactical options to the human for a decision.
This hinges on allowing the humans and machines to individually do what they do best.
The F-35 is a great example of human-machine collaboration. The F-35 is best described
as a flying computer; a network of sensors that analyzes and relays information and data
to the pilot through the helmet.185
Human-machine collaboration and teaming, or using autonomous systems not in
isolation of humans but in tandem, are truly innovative concepts. Previously, unmanned
systems were remotely operated by humans and were slated to replace humans on the
battlefield. Now machines are designed to augment humans. The position that machines
or computers are not meant to supplant humans, but instead are designated to allow
humans to make informed decisions quickly, is supported by Pentagon leadership.186 In
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addition, one can begin to see the far-reaching effects of autonomy on almost every facet
of the military enterprise. From automated cyber response to autonomous underwater
mine sweeping and a litany of other applications are described in the Defense Science
Board’s study on autonomy.187 Delegating command authority to learning machines will
greatly enhance the military enterprise. Not only are the machines capable of rapid
decision making if given autonomy, relying on autonomous systems will keep more
service members out of harm’s way.
A core belief of U.S. strategy, since World War II, has been that the U.S. military
is technological savvy and has better-trained men and women in uniform.188 The
Department of Defense realizes that in today’s competitive environment, U.S.
technologies are subject to theft, intrusion, and duplication. However, the U.S.
warfighter is stressed by U.S. leaders as an asset that cannot be replicated by U.S.
adversaries. For these reasons, the third aim of the third offset strategy is to recruit and
retain the best and brightest minds to pursue cutting-edge technologies and develop
operational concepts. To this end, Secretary of Defense Carter released his Force of the
Future initiatives. One of these initiatives is intended to foster new ideas and attract new
people to the Department. The corporate fellows program allows service members the
opportunity to gain experience in the private sector, where the breakthroughs are
occurring, to bring the ideas back to the organization.189 The idea is to increase the

187. Defense Science Board, Autonomy, 61.
188. Cheryl Pellerin, “Work Details the Future of War at Army Defense College”,
DoD News, Defense Media Activity, April 8, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/NewsArticle-View/Article/604420.
189. Ash Carter, “The Next Two Links to the Force of the Future”, United States
Department of Defense Memorandum, June 9, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/
75

Department’s exposure to the wealth of burgeoning technology. A second effort of the
Force of the Future is geared toward retention. To this end, Secretary Carter
implemented a standard 12-week maternity leave policy and increased access to child
care and insurance. Other efforts include flexibility to offer career incentives and
allowing some experts to enter military service in mid-career capacities.190
Another Force of the Future initiative involves ensuring there are an adequate
knowledge base and workforce to support a more technologically focused military
enterprise.191 For example, to strengthen the workforce, the U.S. is fostering a skilled
base by increasing access and the allure of science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics (STEM) educations. This means investments and scholarships in STEM
programs, at all levels of the U.S. education system, which the U.S. has been pursuing
diligently within the last decade. Once the Pentagon has fostered and acquired the best
and brightest minds, it seeks to retain its personnel, in both its civilian and military ranks.
Competitive benefits and career development are key to retaining a talented workforce.
The Defense Innovation Initiative is department wide and seemingly encompasses
every aspect of the military enterprise. However, its full implementation is not a
foregone conclusion. The third offset faces many obstacles. Some impediments like,
funding and the bureaucratic process, are perennial issues that have plagued the
enterprise for generations. Other barriers like buy-in are as institutional as other
obstacles. However, the organization is attempting to address those issues. Often
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neglected is the implications and consequences the third offset may produce. This should
not be ignored because as the two previous offsets show, today’s efforts can have lasting
ramifications on the enterprise for generations. In addition, there are lingering questions
that need to be resolved or examined. Is now the correct time to pursue an offset
strategy? How much autonomy will the U.S. or an adversary give machines? These and
other questions, implications, and ramifications will be discussed in the next section.
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ANALYZING THE THIRD OFFSET

Introduction
The self-awareness and zeal with which the Department of Defense is pursuing
the third offset strategy are commendable. Indeed, there have been numerous
accomplishments and the enterprise has benefited from new technologies, emerging
operational concepts, and the pursuit of other initiatives. The Department of Defense is
not ready to rest its laurels on these accomplishments and is continuing its efforts to
maintain the U.S. technological advantage. While many obstacles exist to the
implementation of the strategy, the organization is undertaking significant efforts to
overcome these major internal and external hindrances. Three internal obstacles the
Department of Defense can mitigate are funding, its business practices, and buy-in. On
the other hand, external factors, like rising near peers and the proliferation of advanced
technologies, may be beyond U.S. control.
Fundamentally it is important to answer whether this is the correct time to pursue
such a strategy. Is the U.S. advantage so undermined that it must resort to an offset at
present? The Department of Defense believes so and makes a compelling argument for
its position. On the other hand, naysayers will counter that the organization continually
hypes threats to secure funding. In addition, an argument can be made that threat
forecasting is imperfect. A counter argument to this point is that the U.S. has a duty to
prepare for the future or witness its power and influence deteriorate. This back and forth
discourse is necessary for a democracy to ensure there is a balance between security and
other aspects of American life.
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Further, if one accepts the Pentagon position that it is prudent to pursue an offset
at present, is the vision focused enough to be successful? Indeed, it encompasses more
than technology and builds upon lessons from previous offset strategies. Most notable is
this offset seems to be leaving nothing to chance. During the second offset, training and
doctrinal reforms burgeoned alongside advanced technology. Although these
developments occurred organically and independently of the LRRDPP, the reforms and
technologies coalesced to form what is considered the second offset. The third offset
differs by rendering technology, concepts, and people as pillars of the same strategy and
other dimensions, like business practices, are being overhauled to ensure the strategy
transitions smoothly.
It is important to note possible impacts, implications, and ramifications the third
offset may have on the force, force structure, and other facets of the enterprise. The
historical look at the previous offsets shows there can be lasting ramifications and
impacts. Technologies like autonomy and Artificial Intelligence (AI) are viewed as
offering the greatest benefit to the military enterprise at present. In addition, the
integration of technology within the military enterprise has far-reaching ramifications for
the enterprise, U.S. allies, and society. From interconnectedness to machines
increasingly fulfilling human tasks. But how far and how much autonomy is the U.S.
willing to give machines? Ultimately the answer to this question lies in the future
security environment the third offset is intended to compete in and the enduring pillars of
U.S strategy.
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Obstacles the Third Offset Must Overcome
Admittedly, the success of the third offset is not a guarantee and will depend on
numerous factors. Three major internal obstacles the third offset strategy must overcome
are funding, business practices, and acceptance. Funding is an uncertain and limiting
factor to the success of any strategy and the previous administration’s Secretary of
Defense acknowledged that the fiscal environment is a major hurdle for implementation
of the third offset.192 However, the new Trump administration has taken a strong stance
in support of funding and building the U.S. military enterprise and released a proposal to
increase Defense spending by $54 billion next year.193
In addition, the total Federal research and development (R&D) budget requested
for FY 2017 was $152 billion.194 Of the total R&D budget requested, the Department of
Defense was allocated 47.8%, or $71.44 billion.195 In addition, the FY 2016 budget
authorized close to $70 billion for total Department of Defense R&D spending. To
further break down the FY 2016 budget, the more research oriented portion of the
Department’s budget, which includes basic and applied research, as well as, advanced
technology development, accounted for $2.3 billion, $5 billion and $5.7 billion,
respectively.196 Further, two budget activities that authorize funds for new weapons and
platforms, where an operational need has been determined and there is an acquisition
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regime in place, like the Joint Strike Fighter, accounted for $14.3 billion and $12.8
billion.197 Finally, the budget activity that allocates funds for the development of
improvements to existing systems totaled $25.4 billion.198 These numbers show that the
Department of Defense R&D budget and ostensibly, the third offset, is receiving
significant funding.
The second key obstacle to the implementation of the third offset is its business
practices. Return on investments, as well as, controls that ensure the funds are spent
properly and efficiently are integral to show the organization is a trustworthy fiduciary.
In addition, slashing wasteful spending produces the obvious benefit of more defense
dollars for where funds are truly needed. Defense program cost and schedule overruns
have become the normal, however, if the short-term cycles outlined by the third offset is
to succeed, a new standard must be instituted.
Another area where the Department could improve its business practices is in
procurement and acquisition. Currently a bureaucratic labyrinth, procurement needs to
be optimized to accomplish rapid fielding and integration of technologies, if the U.S. is to
operate in short-term cycles. Moreover, this obstacle must be addressed without delay to
meet this requirement. The Pentagon has acknowledged procurement as a limiting factor
and is working to improve procurement with its Better Buying Power 3.0 program.
However, this is the third iteration of this program and hopefully, the organization has
addressed the shortcomings of its previous iterations.
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The third obstacle that must be addressed is buy-in or acceptance of the third
offset strategy. Buy-in of the third offset must occur at all levels; from the U.S.
President, to Congress, to military brass, to battlefield commanders. With the
administration, which introduced the third offset departed from the White House, the new
administration will need to approve of the third offset strategy if the strategy is to survive.
President Trump has affirmed his desire to build up the military, but it is unclear if he
will continue with the third offset strategy. In addition, the Trump administration has
nominated a replacement for the brainchild of the strategy, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Robert Work, with a top Boeing executive, Patrick Shanahan.199 During his tenure,
Deputy Work did a great deal to support the strategy by constantly preaching its tenets at
every opportunity to engrain the third offset in military leaders at all levels.
Congress has a role in funding and accepting the strategy. For example, if
Congress does not approve phase-outs of older capabilities, new third offset technologies
may not be fielded. In addition, continued funding for obsolete capabilities may diminish
the returns expected from the third offset investments. Retiring aging capabilities and
closing or shrinking bases can hurt a Congressman’s constituents. However, the
Department of Defense may offer to replace aging capabilities with third offset platforms
to assuage a Congressman’s concerns. In the end, Congress and the Department of
Defense must work together to overcome their differences.
Importantly, warfighters within the military will need to embrace the strategy.
Not only must the warfighters embrace the game-changing capabilities, they will also
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need to be trained, knowledgeable, and confident in third offset capabilities for the
innovations to be fully exploited. The fast pace of technological innovation creates a
unique predicament for service members. There may come a time when the tempo of
technological advancement has outpaced a human’s ability to remain abreast of emerging
technologies.
Two glaring external obstacles the U.S. will face is the proliferation of technology
and competition. It would be a wasted effort for the U.S. to attempt to stem the spread or
restrict access to emerging technologies. First, the private sector is taking point on
innovation, therefore, any attempts to check the proliferation of technology may stymie
advancement. Or with a restrictive stance, companies may decide not to work with the
Pentagon. Secondly, it does not seem likely that the U.S. could create an effective
control regime. There are countless outlets for the spread of technology and it would be
difficult to stem a fraction of the avenues.
Other actors are no longer sitting idle as the U.S. advances. Currently, other
power actors are attempting to undermine U.S. military superiority. Because adversaries
are undergoing extensive military modernizations and the U.S. no longer expects to have
an advantage for 40 years, short-term innovation cycles are being pursued to stay ahead
of adversarial gains. However, commanding the technological advantage may be
difficult to accomplish indefinitely. The U.S. may want to begin to plan for a short
period where it does not have the advantage. Admittedly, addressing external factors are
extremely difficult, but it was in response to external actors that the U.S. chose to pursue
an offset strategy at present.
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The Pentagon’s Case for a Third Offset
The Pentagon deems it is relevant to pursue an offset at present and Deputy
Secretary Work explained the reason in understandable terms. As he relates the story,
when Ash Carter took the helm at the Department of Defense, he asked Deputy Work and
the Joint Chiefs how the next 25 years will differ from the previous 25 years.200 As they
interpreted it, the security environment had undergone a momentous change at the end of
2013. The 25 years before December 2013, at no time in history, since the Peace of
Westphalia created the modern nation state, had there been a period where one nation had
accumulated so much national power without a worthy competitor.201 The nation that
had accumulated preeminence was the U.S. and the event that led to its ascendancy as the
sole superpower was the fall of the Soviet Union.
For close to 25 years the U.S. had maintained a status far above adversaries and
competitors. However, in December 2013, China began the largest land reclamation
effort ever undertaken, in the South China Sea. In addition, a few months later, in
February and March of 2014, Russia began its invasion and subsequent annexation of
Crimea. From these two events, Deputy Work and the Joint Chiefs determined that the
next 25 years would see the rise of great power states.202 Further, an offset strategy was
chosen because the U.S. had confronted a great power state during the Cold War and the
U.S. had employed an offset strategy to confront the Soviet Union.203
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The Pentagon’s case begs the question, are these life-changing events that require
a new strategy? This is a difficult question to discern. Of course, Deputy Work and the
Joint Chiefs could be incorrect in their prediction. In addition, if the U.S. believes it will
be facing growing power states should it forego naming humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief as priority military missions? This way the U.S. is concentrated on
confronting growing powers. Further, President Eisenhower had an enlightening view
concerning spending on endless contingencies. However, this view may be less relevant
as the U.S. seeks to contain growing powers. Soft power operations can be vital to
winning influence as the other states grow. For these reasons, it seems unlikely that the
Pentagon will change these designations now, but it may need to in the future. While
threat forecasting is difficult, it seems the U.S. can expect the growing power states of
Russia and China to continue their individual quest for ascendancy. Indeed, there has
been a growing number of incidents since 2013 with Russian nuclear bombers entering
NATO airspace and Russian pilots buzzing U.S. ships. Further, Russia seems to have
inserted itself into the Syrian Civil War to ensure that any peace that is mediated includes
Moscow’s influence.
There were many ways the U.S. could address growing power states. However, it
chose an offset strategy because it had been successful in the past. The third iteration of
the offset strategy is similar to its forerunners, although, the third offset has many unique
aspects. Importantly the third offset has built upon its predecessors. Both the second and
third offset learned from the New Look that it was imprudent for the U.S. to pursue a sole
capability and emphasize a singular platform to deliver the capability. During the second
offset, training and doctrinal reforms burgeoned alongside advanced technology.
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Although these developments occurred organically and independently of the LRRDPP,
the reforms and technologies coalesced to form what is considered the second offset. The
third offset differs by rendering technology, concepts, and people as pillars of the same
strategy. In addition, other dimensions of the enterprise are being overhauled to ensure
the strategy is implemented smoothly.
To characterize the third offset as a technology-centric strategy is both correct and
misinformed. Technology is the guiding principle, but it is people, concepts and other
reforms that will bolster the use and introduction of new technologies. Similarly, it is
people, concepts, and reforms that will be transformed by technology. Truly, it is
impossible to differentiate one as more important. The brilliance of the third offset is that
it is taking a comprehensive view of the entire enterprise to make itself ready for the 21st
Century power competition. While the third offset in is the inchoate stages, what is clear
is if the strategy is implemented and the intended outcome is produced, the third offset
will have many implications and impacts on policy, strategy, and force structure.

Predictions, Impacts, and Implications
The third offset will have many implications and impacts on policy, strategy, and
force structure. For example, as the U.S. transfers more responsibilities to machines,
troops numbers will most likely decrease and the composition of units will change as the
units acquire new technologies. In addition, with the growing use of autonomous
systems, there is a new dimension to the ethics and conduct of war. It is important to take
note of possible impacts, implications, and ramifications the third offset may produce
because, as the historical record demonstrates, offset strategies have the potential for
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enduring ramifications. Couple the short cycles with the astounding rate of technological
growth and the U.S. will have less time to adapt to changes and mitigate difficulties. For
this reason, the U.S. must begin a thorough review of outcomes to prevent surprise.
Even though new technologies and concepts are meant to augment humans, the
introduction of more advanced technologies has implications for troop levels and force
structure. Even though humans are not being replaced, there will be less need for humans
as autonomous platforms are fielded. Therefore, it can be predicted that as autonomous
systems proliferate, the overall number of humans in the military enterprise will decrease.
This will hold true for combat, non-combat, and civilian roles and numbers.
Evidence for this claim is supported by platforms like DARPA’s unmanned
vessels and the Army’s Grey Eagle program. DARPA recently released an unmanned
vessel designed to track submarines. In addition, a primary of objective of this unmanned
surface vessel is that a human is never intended to board this vessel at any point during its
operating cycle. Moreover, the autonomous operating system is intended to operate
independently for months with little remote supervisory control.204
The prediction that fewer troops will be needed in noncombat roles can be
concluded because platforms are currently being designed to operate without humans,
during its operating cycle, and operate independently for long periods without human
control. Therefore, fewer humans will be needed to operate non-combat capabilities as
those responsibilities are turned over to machines. This point is further supported by
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DARPA's admission that its vessel is to be fabricated to do without human maintenance
during its life operating cycle. Subsequently, fewer service members will be needed to
perform maintenance on autonomous technologies. In addition, with the majority of
technological advancements occurring outside the military, there is less need for the
enterprise to employ civilians to perform this function.
In addition to requiring fewer members in non-combat specialties, the U.S.
military will also require fewer members in combat roles. Evidence for this claim can be
found in the U.S. Army's Grey Eagle program. The Army’s machine teaming operational
concept utilizes its Apache helicopters to fly missions with autonomous aircraft, called
the Grey Eagle. The autonomous vehicles will act as external extensions of the
helicopter.205 Therefore, fewer helicopters and subsequently, fewer pilots, will be needed
to achieve missions. Further, the force structure of those units will change. The number
of aircraft in each unit will decrease, while the number of autonomous vehicles attached
to each unit will increase. If the same numbers of aircraft remain operational through
these changes, there may be an increase in the total number of helicopter units throughout
the Army's force structure. The possible increase in helicopter units without the need to
increase the number of helicopters would be a positive development. This could mean
the U.S. may be able to increase its forward presence abroad, in places like Europe, to
confront Russia's increasing aggression.
While the above example centered on the Grey Eagle project, it is not hard to
extrapolate this example to the integration of autonomous platforms alongside other
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capabilities and expect similar results. Whether alongside U.S. Navy ships, or Marines,
autonomous entities will enhance human and platform performance with reduced troop
numbers, with the intention, that the overall military effectiveness increases.
So far the human discussion has concentrated on troop numbers and force
structure. However, there is another piece to the human element that is worth
mentioning. The members of the future force will need to be highly capable and
adaptable. The platforms that the men and women will be operating will take extensive
training and intelligence to operate. Further, technologies will be constantly changing
and progressing. Even though machines will assist the human in decision making, the
human ultimately decides the course of action. Therefore, the services will require
people with good judgment and decisiveness. Because the future force will require
people of the highest caliber and ability, one can expect the Department of Defense to
increase pay, bonuses, and benefits for the future generation of warfighters. Additionally,
because familiarization with third offset technologies, platforms, and concepts will
require extensive study, the Department of Defense may look to extend the time of
military occupation schools. Moreover, because initial training time may be increased,
the military should examine the feasibility of increasing initial enlistment contracts.
Training time will most likely increase unless the enterprise can rely on STEM
investments to train its workforce before they arrive at initial training. It may be best for
the enterprise to recruit trained men and women before they are hired.
There are ramifications of a smaller U.S. military and a more technologically
educated warfighter on American society. First, it is important to recognize that with
fewer positions in the military, some Americans willing to serve their country may be

89

excluded. In addition, the available positions may become extremely competitive. While
STEM investments are important to train a workforce, they are also important so
Americans of all backgrounds and educations have the option to serve. Second, it may
seem futuristic and implausible, but it is important that the military enterprise does not
become an exclusive cadre of elite troops. As fewer Americans become involved in the
military, due to openings, this means fewer Americans will have a personal connection to
a service member. This could create an environment where the troops who serve are
removed from American society. In addition, it is important that a diverse range of
Americans serve so every sector of the American population is represented. This will
ensure leaders are held accountable for future military operations. In the end, while
machines will increasingly assist humans in military operations, humans will continue to
be present in combat environments. Technology may limit and reduce human exposure
to warfare, but the human element will continue to experience the realities of warfare.
In addition to the changes at the human level, the third offset has implications for
U.S. policy and strategy. U.S. adversaries, especially China, are developing asymmetric
capabilities aimed at denying the U.S. the freedom to intervene and navigate Pacific
waters in the event of a dispute with the U.S. At the crux of the Chinese A2AD strategy
is the modernization and sophistication of its ballistic missile arsenal. Chinese ballistic
missiles are intended to threaten U.S. aircraft carriers and coerce a limited response.
Moreover, multiple countries, including numerous U.S. allies, dispute Chinese land
reclamation efforts in the South China Sea. One could see how an autonomous vessel,
capable of continuously operating, could conduct freedom of navigation missions to
refute Chinese claims in the South China Sea and bolster America’s presence and
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commitment. Although a caveat to utilizing autonomous vehicles to refute Chinese
claims is that autonomous vehicles may not have standing to refute claims within
international law.
Technologies like the electromagnetic railgun will allow the U.S. Navy the
freedom to navigate and operate in the Pacific. If fielded the railgun’s fast and
inexpensive rounds will ensure the U.S. cannot be coerced by Chinese ballistic missiles.
Not only could the railgun protect against Chinese missiles, the railgun’s inexpensive
rounds and directed energy weapons could liberate the U.S. from the ballistic missile
interceptor quandary. Both the railgun and directed energy weapons offer the U.S. an
opportunity to change the asymmetric nature of missiles and interceptors by putting the
cost burden on actors who would choose to employ ballistic missiles. Furthermore, when
coupled with the human-machine collaboration, the railgun and directed energy weapons
could effectively defeat salvo missile launches. The machine could quickly relay the
coordinates and trajectories of salvo launch missiles and inform the human of which
missiles have the potential to cause the most damage or harm, and which may fall
harmlessly into the ocean.
The previous examples illustrate the third offset’s possible effect on weighty
defense issues like the U.S. rebalance to Asia and countering ballistic missiles. However,
the third offset has implications for soft operations like drones capable of delivering
humanitarian assistance to regions that are otherwise inaccessible due to a disease
outbreak or a natural disaster. Supplies could include water, food, and medicine or even
a portal advanced manufacturing station so an affected population can rebuild. Not only
would this prevent the U.S. from putting its troops at risk, it also ensures the U.S. military
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fulfills its responsibilities and demonstrates U.S. resolve to confront instabilities at all
levels. Other soft power operations may include sharing technology with allies and
partners to establish goodwill and bolster security. Also, by embracing a technologically
advanced economy, the U.S. can maintain its economic strength to encourage
partnerships and hedge against growing powers.
Importantly, these examples indicate that the third offset will impact U.S.
relationships. The U.S. may look to allies to fulfill niche roles or support smaller and
agiler militaries that can absorb innovation more rapidly, to make modernizations the
U.S. cannot. Possible changes in force structures may allow the U.S. to continue and
possibly increase its forward presence. This would demonstrate the enduring U.S.
commitment to its allies and partners. Further, to U.S. adversaries, the third offset will
indicate the U.S. will not resign itself to accept a dwindling U.S. technological lead.
Instead, the U.S. will rise to challenge and adapt to changing circumstances to guarantee
the U.S. remains a global power.
It is beyond the best prognosticator’s ability to predict the effect that the third
offset will have on the Department of Defense budget. However, it will be interesting to
witness the effect the third offset will have on large, expensive traditional platforms like
the Air Force’s Long Range Strike Bomber and the U.S. Navy’s Ohio Class Replacement
submarine. These large platforms may become obsolete and the U.S. may transition to
smaller platforms that interact with autonomous vehicles. Or these large platforms may
become a type of queen bee to a vast swarm of autonomous vehicles.206
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On a final note, the third offset has the potential to introduce a new element to the
ethics and conduct of war. Currently, the U.S. maintains that a human will always be the
final decision maker in any situation where a human life can be taken.207 Vehicles like
DARPA’s vessel and the Grey Eagle project are intended to augment the human and do
not have the authority to take a human life. However, it is not difficult to believe that one
day these autonomous extensions may have the capability to protect U.S. lives by taking
enemy lives. At what point will the U.S. allow independent vehicles a license to kill?
While the U.S. remains adamant that the human should be the final decision maker when
it comes to taking lives, this does not mean that U.S. adversaries will have the same
beliefs. How will the U.S. respond? Currently, this dimension has more questions than
answers.
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CONCLUSION

The first offset strategy was the Eisenhower administration’s New Look strategy
that strove to offset Soviet conventional strength with U.S. nuclear and atomic
technological superiority. The New Look placed importance on the U.S. strategic arsenal
deliverable by airpower to deter Soviet aggression and prevent escalation. In addition to
the strategic arsenal, the U.S. Army developed and devised doctrine, as well as,
battlefield nuclear and atomic weapons to fight and sustain in a nuclear environment.
U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical, was viewed by the
Eisenhower administration as a way to achieve deterrence at a bearable cost. The idea of
cost effective deterrence was predicated on President Eisenhower’s personal beliefs that a
robust economy was the foundation of a strong foreign policy and profligate defense
spending would undermine American freedom and liberties.
The New Look was a practical and principled strategy that was tailored to address
threats within the limits of the Eisenhower administration’s outlook. In addition, the
New Look resulted in the development of the U.S nuclear arsenal, including the nuclear
triad, that continues to be a mainstay of U.S. strategy today. Not only does the nuclear
arsenal serve in defense of the U.S., but in the case of extended deterrence, the U.S.
nuclear arsenal has built relationships with allies and partners around the globe, while
simultaneously stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The development of the
nuclear arsenal during the New Look period offers an important insight concerning the
far-reaching and enduring ramifications that such strategies can impart. While the U.S.
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relied on its nuclear arsenal to offset Soviet conventional strength in the 1950s, the U.S.
advantage in nuclear weapon technology was fleeting.
After the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in March 1973, the U.S. pivoted its
attentions to the increasing Soviet threat and possible conflict in Central Europe. There
was a growing uneasiness over the U.S. ability to deter Soviet military action due to
Soviet conventional and nuclear modernizations, both quantitively and quantality. The
prevailing thought was that with nuclear parity, which was achieved in the early 1970s, as
well as conventional numerical and qualitative superiority, the Soviets would no longer
be deterred from a conventional invasion of Central Europe.
The second offset strategy is considered the period, from the early 1970s through
the 1980s, when the U.S. pursued investments in precision guided munitions, long
range/stealth aircraft, intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance platforms which
would serve as force multipliers to upset the Soviet-U.S. imbalance. Unlike the first
offset period, that is clearly defined by the New Look, the second offset cannot be
attached to one administration or condensed to a sole strategy. On the contrary, the
second offset spanned twenty years and included multiple administrations and Pentagon
leaders. In addition, while the New Look relied on the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal for
security, the second offset sought to bolster conventional deterrence by outfitting
platforms and weapons with over the horizon technologies. Over the horizon
technologies served to increase battlefield awareness, capability, depth, and scope to
make U.S. conventional platforms more accurate while simultaneously reducing
collateral damage and fratricide.
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Crucial to the success of the second offset was the transformation of U.S. military
doctrines, warfighting concepts, and training that took place after the Vietnam War.
These military doctrines accompanied a focused shift in U.S. military strategy away from
a counterinsurgency type conflict in Vietnam War to confronting and deterring the Soviet
threat. The development of the AirLand Battle doctrine by TRADOC in 1982 exploited
the overlapping suite of technologically advanced capabilities and platforms that were
beginning to come to fruition; most notably the Army’s Big Five. In addition to military
doctrines, the U.S. military transformed into an All-Volunteer Force while at the same
time boosting military training. National Training Centers and training programs like
Topgun granted the U.S. the opportunity to obtain tactical and technical proficiency
before actual engagement with the enemy. In the end, the efficiency, effectiveness, and
awareness of technologically advanced platforms were compounded with augmented
training and doctrinal transformations.
The U.S. is currently pursuing its third iteration of the offset strategy in response
to a strategic inflection point characterized as growing great powers capable of
challenging U.S. power, the unpredictable security environment where the U.S. seeks to
address a host of contingencies from general war to humanitarian assistance and finally,
as a response to an erosion of the U.S. technological lead. Per the Pentagon, an offset
strategy was chosen based on its historical utility to offset Soviet military strength during
the Cold War. The third offset strategy is aimed with advancing cutting-edge
technologies for use in military applications, developing operational concepts to
maximize the utility of cutting-edge technologies, and finally with retaining the best and
brightest Americans for service in the U.S. military. In addition, the third offset strategy
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is a Department wide effort and includes other programs to reduce internal barriers the
third offset faces.
In the third offset, technology is the guiding principle, but it is people, concepts
and other reforms that will bolster the use and introduction of new technologies.
Similarly, it is people, concepts, and reforms that will be transformed by technology.
Truly, it is impossible to differentiate one as more important. The brilliance of the third
offset is that it is taking a comprehensive view of the entire enterprise to make itself
ready for the 21st Century power competition.
According to the U.S. 2015 National Military Strategy, the U.S. currently faces
multiple and simultaneous security challenges from many threat actors with a wide array
of capabilities.208 This has created a security environment that is complex and prone to
rapid changes. These rapid changes are fueling the future security environment and
factors such as demographic shifts, globalization, altering power dynamics, and the
diffusion of technology are indeed shaping a security environment not seen in 25 years.
Demographic shifts mean the future security environment will consist of a growing and
more urbanized global population. Military interventions and operations will
increasingly occur near urban centers as the populations and thus, power centers, shift to
sprawling urban areas. Conducting military operations in urban environments creates
unique challenges. For example, discerning between combatants and noncombatants in
large urban areas will become more difficult. In addition, collateral damage must not
only be minimized but may become a liability as the interconnectedness through
globalization and technology means that military actions will be broadcast throughout the
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world in a matter of seconds. Here, the development of A.I. and autonomous systems
that can sift through large quantities of data and sufficiently identify combatants and
legitimate targets is needed for future operations. The third offset development of such
capabilities seems promising to address this element of the future security environment.
The spread of technology and the rapid pace at which technological innovation is
occurring is blinding. What is created today is obsolete tomorrow and in some cases,
sooner. There will come a time when the U.S. must decide when to field a capability that
may not have the most current technology. Because the rate of innovation is rapid,
continually waiting for the next iteration of technology could jeopardize readiness and
produce costly contract budget overruns. Therefore, the U.S. must execute upgrades
when funds and time are available. Additionally, the U.S. government no longer has the
monopoly on technological innovation. Technological advancements today are occurring
in the private sector for commercial use. Therefore, the U.S. defense enterprise must
solicit the private sector for new technologies and tailor those technologies to meet its
requirements. For this reason, the Department of Defense launched the DUIx unit in
various technology hubs throughout the U.S. Not only is this a promising avenue for the
acquisition of new technologies, but it may serve as a method to recruit bright individuals
from the private sector to the defense enterprise.
Further, U.S. adversaries are developing unique ways to undermine U.S. power by
introducing methods of warfare like A2AD capabilities, lawfare, and hybrid conflict.
Again, third offset technologies and operational concepts are geared toward addressing
these challenges; from the Navy’s railgun that may upset the ballistic missile defense cost
dilemma to continuously operating unmanned systems that may help to overturn China’s
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claims in the South China Sea. In addition, with the advent of advanced manufacturing,
the logistic barriers to confronting threats around the globe will be reduced.
If the defense enterprise implements the third offset the force of the future will
look starkly different from today. While planning and preparing for the future is crucial,
it is also imperative the U.S. not neglect the present security challenges. In contrast,
foregoing the future for present challenges and operations can jeopardize the U.S.
readiness and ability to address future challenges and threats. The best way forward is to
balance present requirements and future needs to maximize both the present and future
force. Balancing these constraints will be difficult and risks will need to be minimized to
short-term and long-term capabilities, but it is important that neither the long- nor shortterm readiness is lacking.
On a final note, it is important the defense enterprise not morph into an exclusive
body comprised of an elite cadre of tech warfighters that are removed from American
society. As machines are expected to replace humans in the private and commercial
sector, one can assume this will also hold true for military jobs. STEM investments are
important not only to train capable individuals to fill the ranks but to offer the
opportunity for every American citizen the chance to serve his or her country.
Indeed, the third offset is underway and is geared toward operating in the future
security environment. As Secretary of Defense Brown would later reflect on the second
offset period and say “The Carter Administration initiated and developed these programs,
the Reagan Administration paid for their acquisition in many cases and the…Bush
Administration employed them.”209 If the past is any indication of the future, the Obama

209. Grant, “The Second Offset”.
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administration set the strategic guidance for the third offset and it seems that the Trump
administration will increase military spending to pay for the development of the third
offset. In the end, if implemented, the third offset strategy will produce technologies and
operational concepts the next President can utilize if deterrence fails.
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